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  Constitutional doctrine frequently employs tests that operate on 
abstract conceptual inputs rather than objectively identifiable facts. 
Consider some examples: substantive due process doctrine directs 
attention to whether a violated “right” qualifies as fundamental or 
nonfundamental; Commerce Clause doctrine directs attention to 
whether a regulated “activity” qualifies as economic or noneconomic; 
the strict scrutiny test directs attention to whether a relevant 
“government interest” qualifies as compelling or noncompelling; and 
so forth. These sorts of decision rules call for an evaluation of variables 
whose scope, content, and character are frequently up for debate, 
thereby requiring courts to characterize constitutional inputs as a 
precondition to reaching constitutional results. To determine whether 
the government has violated a “fundamental right,” courts must first 
characterize the relevant right whose fundamentality is at issue. To 
determine whether a congressional enactment regulates an “economic 
activity,” courts must first characterize the relevant activity whose 
economic nature must be scrutinized. To determine whether a 
challenged law pursues a “compelling government interest,” courts 
must first characterize the relevant government interest whose 
importance is to be assessed. Tests of this sort thus implicate not just 
the familiar judicial challenge of evaluating a given variable by 
reference to an established doctrinal criterion, but also the less familiar 
(and often unnoticed) challenge of extracting from a fact pattern an 
operative characterization of the variable to be evaluated. 
  This Article examines these input-characterization problems as a 
general challenge of constitutional decisionmaking. The Article makes 
three contributions. First, the Article demonstrates the widespread 
presence of characterization problems within constitutional law, 
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highlighting both the broad range of contexts in which these problems 
arise and the limited amount of attention they have thus far generated. 
Second, the Article explores the possibility of avoiding input-
characterization problems through the reformulation of constitutional 
decision rules, considering in particular the tradeoffs implicated by the 
replacement of “characterization-dependent” decision rules with 
“characterization-resistant” alternatives. Finally, the Article works 
through the various methods by which courts might confront 
characterization problems on their own terms, asking whether there 
exist reliable and predictable means of selecting an authoritative input 
characterization from the many possibilities that the facts might afford. 
In sum, this analysis reveals that input-characterization problems are 
neither easily avoidable nor easily solvable, thus raising critical 
questions regarding the determinacy and coherence of the doctrine writ 
large. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Suppose that you have given me a collection of photographs and 
invited me to take from that collection any and all pictures of things 
that make me happy. I accept your invitation and start looking for 
photos to claim. Adhering strictly to your instructions, I ask with 
respect to each photo, “Does the subject of this picture make me 
happy?,” and I select only those photos for which the answer to this 
question is “yes.” Some photos are easy to deal with: I eagerly grab the 
photo of the dog, and I fervently reject the photo of smog. Others 
present a more complex calculus: I’m initially flummoxed by the 
photograph of a computer—sometimes computers make me happy, 
other times they do not—but I ultimately decide that my overall 
feelings toward computers are more positive than negative and thus 
add the photo to my pile. And I continue to make similar such 
judgments on a photo-by-photo basis, generally satisfied in my ability 
to distinguish between things that do and do not make me happy. 
Suddenly, however, I hit a roadblock1: 
 
My problem is this: I know that the earth makes me happy and I 
know that the moon does not, but I cannot figure out whether this is a 
picture of the earth or of the moon. Worse still, I worry that the picture 
might depict something other than “the earth” or “the moon”: perhaps 
it depicts “outer space,” “sunlight,” “celestial orbs,” “Earth as seen 
 
 1. As best I can gather, this photograph was taken by William Anders during the Apollo 8 
mission, on December 24, 1968. Earthrise (photograph), NAT’L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN., 
https://www.nasa.gov/multimedia/imagegallery/image_feature_1249.html [https://perma.cc/BA
9B-XX9A]. 
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from the moon,” “Earthrise over the moon,” or even “what the Apollo 
8 astronauts saw on December 24, 1968.” 
And then I start to wonder about other choices that I previously 
made. Was that photo of a dog really a photo of “a dog,” or was it a 
photo of “a snarling guard dog”? Was that photo of smog really a photo 
of “smog,” or was it a photo of “a somewhat obscured urban center”? 
Was that photo of a computer really a photo of “a computer,” or was 
it a photo of “an Apple IIC computer,” or was it a photo of “plastic”? 
I am identifying more and more potential subjects of each photograph, 
some more happy-seeming than others, but all of which strike me as 
equally valid characterizations of the images with which they are 
associated. And yet, I somehow must choose only one characterization 
out of each multitude in order to decide what to do with the picture it 
describes. 
Suppose now that I am a judge tasked with deciding the following 
case. 
Patient is suffering from a terminal illness and anticipates death within 
the year. Patient very much wishes to die on her own terms, rather than 
drag herself and her family through the painful ordeal of a slow 
medical decline. Patient asks Doctor to administer life-ending 
treatment, but Doctor refuses, citing to a state-law prohibition on 
“causing the death of a person.” Patient claims that the law violates the 
substantive component of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause.2 
Having recently studied up on substantive due process doctrine, I 
know that my disposition of this claim will depend on whether the 
“right” being asserted by the plaintiff qualifies as “fundamental” or 
“nonfundamental,”3 and I know how I should go about assessing a 
right’s fundamentality. Here too, however, I encounter a problem: I am 
not sure how to characterize the right whose fundamentality I should 
assess. Is Patient asserting a “right to commit suicide,” a “right to 
demand physician-assisted suicide,” a “right to die with dignity,” a 
“right to refuse to continue living,” a “right to spare one’s family 
members of emotional pain,” a “right to make decisions about one’s 
 
 2. Cf. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (presenting a similar fact pattern). 
 3. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 826 
(5th ed. 2015) (“The Supreme Court has held that some liberties are so important that they are 
deemed to be ‘fundamental rights’ and that generally the government cannot infringe upon them 
unless strict scrutiny is met.”). 
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own body,” or some other “right” altogether?4 Some of these rights 
seem more fundamental than others, but before I can even get to the 
question of fundamentality, I have to extract from the fact pattern a 
claim of right to be assessed. And this is no easy task. All of the rights 
I have considered strike me as descriptively accurate characterizations 
of the facts I am confronting, and yet I must select one and only one 
such characterization as the basis for my disposition of the substantive 
due process claim. 
These two hypotheticals—the first, a figment of my imagination, 
the second, an adaptation of Washington v. Glucksberg5—highlight 
what I call the challenge of input characterization (or, the challenge of 
characterization, for short). This challenge arises whenever we must 
characterize factual information (for example, a photographic image 
or the fact pattern of a case) in terms of an abstract concept (the subject 
of the photograph or the right implicated by the case), which we then 
proceed to evaluate by reference to an operative criterion (is the 
subject of the photograph a “thing that makes me happy”?; is the right 
“fundamental” or “nonfundamental”?). The task is challenging 
because facts are often susceptible to large numbers of competing 
characterizations, and we have no obvious means of choosing a 
particular characterization to serve as the input for our evaluative 
inquiry. And the task is important because the characterization choices 
that we make will often influence, if not wholly dictate, the result of 
that inquiry itself. 
These challenges are by no means unfamiliar to constitutional 
scholars, many of whom have commented on the importance and 
difficulty of defining the proper level of generality with which to frame 
the subject of a given doctrinal inquiry.6 As I understand it, however, 
 
 4. Many of these formulations were proposed and considered throughout the litigation of 
Glucksberg itself. See, e.g., Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 724 (referring to the “right to commit suicide 
with another’s assistance”); id. at 722 (referring to the “right to choose a humane, dignified 
death”); id. at 755 (Souter, J., concurring) (referring to the “right to physician assistance”). 
 5. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).  
 6. Most of the commentary concerns the particular problem of defining rights for purposes 
of substantive due process doctrine. See, e.g., Paul Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: 
The Essential Contradictions of Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063, 1084 
(1981) (noting that “[t]he levels-of-abstraction problem is pervasive, infecting theories of 
adjudication based on rights and consensus as well as tradition”); Laurence H. Tribe & Michael 
C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the Definition of Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1057, 1065 (1990) 
(“Rightly or wrongly, the battle for constitutional meaning occurs primarily in the interpretation 
of prior cases. And competing characterizations of the level of generality at which to describe 
rights often constitute the principal weapons in that battle.”); Anthony S. Winer, Levels of 
Generality and the Protection of LGBT Rights Before the United Nations General Assembly, 41 
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the challenge of characterization implicates more than just the well-
known levels-of-generality problem. Characterization choices, in other 
words, implicate not just questions about generality, but also questions 
about what descriptive features of a fact pattern to include in—and 
exclude from—the doctrinal inputs that judges end up evaluating.7 We 
might all agree, for instance, that I should characterize the NASA 
photograph at a low level of generality, but that fact alone does not tell 
us whether the characterization should be “the Earth on December 24, 
1968,” or “the Earth as seen by the crew of Apollo 8.” Similarly, we 
might all agree that the right at issue in Glucksberg merited a high-
generality characterization, but that fact alone does not tell us whether 
the characterization should have been a “right to die with dignity,” a 
“right to die with a physician’s assistance,” or a “right to die at a time 
of one’s own choosing.”8 I will elaborate on this point further in the 
 
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 80, 91–100 (2015) (evaluating how levels of generality affect judicial 
decisions). See generally John F. Basiak, Jr., Inconsistent Levels of Generality in the 
Characterization of Unenumerated Fundamental Rights, 16 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 401 (2005) 
(analyzing how courts characterize fundamental rights). Some commentators, though, have noted 
the existence of similar problems within and across other domains as well. See, e.g., Alan K. Chen, 
Shadow Law: Reasonable Unreasonableness, Habeas Theory, and the Nature of Legal Rules, 2 
BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 535, 585 n.167 (1999) (noting that “levels of generality problems pervade 
qualified immunity, Teague, and [other habeas questions],” while analogizing to levels of 
generality problems that arise in the context of substantive due process doctrine); David L. 
Faigman, Measuring Constitutionality Transactionally, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 753, 778–83 (1994) 
(discussing the importance of characterization choices in connection with inquiries that require a 
balancing of “liberty interests” against “government interests”); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict 
Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1271 (2007) (“Although it is widely recognized that 
courts must determine the ‘level of generality’ at which constitutional rights should be defined . . . 
the Court has largely ignored parallel questions involving the generality with which government 
interests should be specified.”); Dov Fox, Interest Creep, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 273, 275 (2014) 
(noting “the central place of state interest definition in constitutional adjudication,” while noting 
the Court’s “‘astonishingly casual approach’ to articulating or evaluating those sources of 
government concern that ambiguous interests comprise” (quoting Fallon, supra, at 1321)); Mark 
V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 
96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 791 (1983) (“Frequently an analysis turns completely on the level of 
generality at which some feature of the issue under analysis is described.”).  
 7. See Tribe & Dorf, supra note 6, at 1091 (highlighting this difficulty). 
 8. In this sense, the characterization of constitutional inputs bears some similarity to what 
Mark Kelman has described as the process of “interpretive construction” within U.S. criminal 
law. See Mark Kelman, Interpretive Construction in Substantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L. REV. 
591, 593–97 (1981). In deciding criminal cases, judges must often engage in processes whereby 
“concrete situations are reduced to substantive legal controversies.” Id. at 592. Thus, for instance, 
in assessing the blameworthiness of a defendant’s conduct, judges must first select a “relevant 
time frame,” which may or may not include “some obviously voluntary act that contributes to the 
ultimate harm.” Id. Similarly, judges often choose whether to represent a fact pattern in terms of 
a single “unified” incident or as a series of “disjoined” incidents, and that choice in turn can affect 
their assessment of the legal claims that the parties have raised. See id. at 616–20. Within criminal 
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discussion below,9 but for now it suffices to say that the levels-of-
generality problem represents only one aspect of the problem that I am 
considering here. With that broader understanding of the problem in 
place, we are more likely to notice its occurrence across many different 
areas of constitutional law. 
Indeed, a central claim of this Article is that the challenge of input 
characterization presents a pervasive problem for judges tasked with 
deciding constitutional cases.10 In case after constitutional case, 
involving clause after constitutional clause, courts must characterize 
complex bodies of factual details in terms of a single abstract concept 
that a decision rule demands. Glucksberg illustrates this point with 
respect to substantive due process doctrine: the case law distinguishes 
between claims involving fundamental and nonfundamental rights, and 
it thus requires courts to extract from each case’s fact pattern a 
characterization of the relevant right whose fundamentality can then 
be gauged.11 But characterization problems arise with equal frequency 
in many other domains. To determine whether a federal court plaintiff 
has Article III standing, one must first characterize the plaintiff’s 
various burdens, grievances, indignities, and other harms in terms of a 
single “injury” whose concreteness, traceability, and redressability can 
then be evaluated.12 To determine whether a law survives strict 
scrutiny, one must characterize the complex cluster of problems, 
policies, objectives, and effects of the law in terms of a “government 
interest” whose overall importance and closeness of fit can then be 
evaluated.13 To determine whether a federal law preempts a state law, 
one must characterize various facts about each law as a description of 
each law’s regulatory “field” before then proceeding to address 
whether those fields problematically overlap.14 This list could go on, 
but the key point is simply that constitutional decision rules frequently 
operate on abstract characterizations of the facts rather than directly 
on the facts themselves. And where that is so, courts must characterize 
 
law, that is, “a legal-sounding argument can be made only after a situation is characterized 
nonrationally, so that the advocate seems able to deduce a single result on principle.” Id. at 592. 
This Article attempts to show that a similar phenomenon is at work within various areas of 
constitutional doctrine as well. 
 9. For a criticism of different approaches to characterization problems that focus 
exclusively on calibrating generality levels, see infra Part IV.A.  
 10. See infra Part II. 
 11. See infra Part II.A. 
 12. See infra Part II.E. 
 13. See infra Part II.C. 
 14. See infra Part II.F. 
COENEN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 1/5/2018  3:12 PM 
750  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 67:743 
constitutional inputs as a precondition to generating constitutional 
results. 
This fact is not problematic in and of itself, but it becomes 
problematic when another fact comes to light. And that fact, which I 
will also endeavor to demonstrate in the pages below, is that the 
Supreme Court does not often pause to defend, let alone acknowledge, 
the characterization choices that it makes. All too often, contestable 
characterizations of the facts are simply adopted without explanation, 
buried within elaborate and involved discussions as to why one 
decision rule or another should be adopted or why a characterized 
input does or does not satisfy the terms of the decision rule being 
applied. The Court has told us much about how it evaluates the 
fundamentality of an unenumerated right, but it has told us relatively 
little about how it goes about characterizing the particular right that a 
given case implicates. Similarly, the Court has told us much about what 
distinguishes a mere “generalized grievance” from a cognizable injury-
in-fact, but it has told us relatively little about how it goes about 
characterizing the particular injury that a plaintiff claims to have 
suffered. The Court has told us much about what sorts of government 
interests qualify as “compelling,” but it has told us relatively little 
about how it goes about identifying the relevant interest that a given 
law pursues. To be sure, not all of the Court’s characterization choices 
have been rendered so casually; some choices have been conducted out 
in the open, although even here the justifications for those choices have 
been largely unilluminating. But given the frequency with which the 
Court characterizes its constitutional inputs, it is both surprising and 
concerning that the Justices have had so little to say about how courts 
should go about performing this important task. 
This Article aims to draw attention to a vital yet largely 
underappreciated facet of the Court’s constitutional work. It begins in 
Part I by explaining in more detail how characterization choices fit into 
the constitutional decisionmaking process and why characterization 
choices are worth examining as a unitary and “trans-substantive” 
problem of constitutional law. With the brush thus cleared, Part II 
proceeds to advance the two major descriptive claims of the Article, 
demonstrating first, that many different decision rules of constitutional 
law operate on inputs that can only be identified via contestable 
characterizations of the facts, and second, that courts only rarely offer 
satisfactory justifications—or for that matter any justifications at all—
for the characterization choices they have made. The challenge of 
characterization, in short, is as widespread as it is underexamined, 
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making it all the more important for us to analyze the structure of the 
problem it presents. 
The remainder of this Article takes up that task. Part III looks at 
the challenge of characterization through the lens of decision rule 
design. This Part considers the possibility of crafting constitutional 
doctrine in such a way as to minimize the decisional influence of 
characterization choices—in effect, responding to the challenge of 
characterization by rendering difficult characterization choices 
irrelevant to the application of a given legal norm. This strategy might 
be pursued in one of three ways. First, the Court might prescribe 
decision rules that operate on specifically described and easily 
identifiable features of a fact pattern, calling for the assessment of 
targeted inputs drawn directly from the facts.15 Second, and at the 
opposite extreme, the Court might prescribe decision rules that 
operate on the entirety of a given fact pattern, calling for a holistic and 
all-things-considered assessment of all aspects of a transaction giving 
rise to a case.16 Finally, even where a decision rule operates on a 
characterized input, courts might attempt to neutralize the influence of 
the characterization choice by installing equilibrating or self-corrective 
mechanisms into the decision rule itself.17 These three strategies, I 
argue, can and sometimes do succeed at producing various forms of 
characterization-resistant constitutional doctrine. But they will not 
always be available for courts to use. And when that is so, courts have 
no choice but to confront the challenge of characterization head on. 
 
 15. Consider, for instance, rules that accord differing levels of First Amendment protection 
based on whether a defamation plaintiff qualifies as a public or nonpublic figure. See, e.g., Curtis 
Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 134 (1967); N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 264 (1964); see 
also Stephen J. Mattingly, Drawing a Dangerous Line: Why the Public-Concern Test in the 
Constitutional Law of Defamation Is Harmful to the First Amendment, and What Courts Should 
Do About It, 47 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 739, 742 (2009) (noting that New York Times and Butts 
“established that the status of a defamation plaintiff determined the contours of the protection 
afforded to the speech in question”). 
 16. Consider, for instance, the Court’s suggestion that the “reasonableness” of a given search 
be assessed by reference to the “totality of circumstances” accompanying the search. See, e.g., 
Grady v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 1368, 1371 (2015) (per curiam) (“The reasonableness of a 
search depends on the totality of the circumstances . . . .”). 
 17. Consider, for instance, the various forms of means/ends analysis, in which the breadth of 
a characterized government interest might simultaneously militate in favor of a finding that the 
interest qualifies as “compelling” and militate against a finding that the challenge law is “narrowly 
tailored” to serve that interest. See Roger Craig Green, Note, Interest Definition in Equal 
Protection: A Study of Judicial Technique, 108 YALE L.J. 439, 447 (1998) (noting that “as 
[government] interests are defined more narrowly, they become less important,” while also noting 
that “as interests are defined more generally, they become less related to the government policy 
at issue”). 
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Part IV thus considers how courts should go about characterizing 
constitutional inputs. More specifically, it considers three different 
strategies for constraining characterization choices, asking how and 
according to what guideposts courts should select a particular 
characterization of the facts. The first strategy attempts to constrain 
characterization choices by prescribing the requisite level of generality 
with which a relevant input should be characterized. (If, for instance, I 
had been instructed to characterize the subject of each photograph at 
a “high” level of generality, I would have had some basis for concluding 
that a photo depicted a “dog” rather than a “snarling guard-dog.”) But 
this strategy can only achieve so much, encountering limitations that 
result both from the difficulty of communicating and measuring desired 
generality levels and from the reality that multiple competing 
characterizations will often exist at the same overall level of 
abstraction. The second strategy employs what I call results-based 
characterization; utilizing this strategy, the Court would simply instruct 
its subordinates to characterize inputs in whatever manner is most 
likely to produce the correct-seeming outcome under the decision rule 
being applied. (As applied to the example of the photographs, this 
strategy would instruct me to ask first whether a picture makes me feel 
happy and then to characterize the photograph in terms of a “subject” 
that accords with this feeling.) In contrast to the generality-based 
strategy, this strategy is at least sometimes capable of generating 
determinate and predictable characterization choices, but it will also 
have the effect of rendering the operative decision rule largely 
irrelevant to the decision it purports to guide. Finally, the Court might 
call for precedent-driven characterization choices, instructing courts to 
characterize constitutional inputs in a manner that coheres with 
characterization choices made in previous, similar cases. (If, for 
instance, I had previously characterized a picture with a dog in it as a 
“picture of a dog,” that strategy would instruct me to do the same thing 
in connection with similarly canine-focused pictures.) This strategy 
likewise carries only limited promise: among other things, the 
precedent-driven approach may impose undue cognitive burdens on 
the decisionmaker and may be impossible to pursue without once again 
converting the process into a doctrinally irrelevant sideshow. 
The bad news, then, is that the analysis in Part IV fails to identify 
an approach to characterization choices that qualifies as both 
nonarbitrary and nonduplicative of the inquiry it purports to guide. All 
is not lost, however, as Part V attempts to sketch out a different 
understanding of the role that characterization choices might play in 
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the resolution of constitutional cases. The suggestion here is that 
characterization choices, along with the decision rules to which they 
attach, might make more sense when understood as an output-focused 
rather than input-focused phenomenon—concerned less with dictating 
results ex ante than they are with communicating a set of judgments 
that would otherwise resist easy description. That observation, in turn, 
might prompt a broader reexamination of the purposes and benefits of 
constitutional decision rules. In particular, the suggestion is that, to the 
extent that characterization-dependent decision rules afford benefits 
to the doctrine as a whole, those benefits may have more to do with the 
appearance of continuity across cases rather than with the actuality of 
the same. The suggestions here are largely tentative, but they do, I 
hope, at least demonstrate the importance of thinking carefully about 
the challenge of characterization and its relationship to the broader 
challenge of deciding constitutional cases over time. 
I.  THE CHARACTERIZATION PROCESS 
A. Basic Model of Constitutional Adjudication 
To understand the challenge of characterization, it may help to 
begin with an idealized account of how constitutional decisionmaking 
works. Constitutional litigation, like any other area of litigation, 
requires attention to both the law and the facts. To decide a 
constitutional case, a court must identify the applicable rule, identify 
the relevant facts, and then apply the rule to those facts. 
With this picture in view, we can identify three tasks of importance 
to the enterprise. The first is that of fact identification—the 
development of a factual record against which to resolve the 
constitutional question before the court.18 Fact identification can occur 
in a number of different ways, depending on the issues or procedural 
posture of a case: the parties might stipulate certain facts, some facts 
might be assumed, other facts might be found by a judge or jury, and 
so-called legislative facts might find their way into the case via amicus 
briefs or independent judicial research. These processes in turn 
generate different types of information: they might tell us, for instance, 
 
 18. For useful investigations into the various challenges to which this process gives rise, see 
DAVID L. FAIGMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL FICTIONS: A UNIFIED THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
FACTS (2008); Brianne J. Gorod, The Adversarial Myth: Appellate Court Extra-Record 
Factfinding, 61 DUKE L.J. 1 (2011); Allison Orr Larsen, Confronting Supreme Court Fact Finding, 
98 VA. L. REV. 1255 (2012). 
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what was said during a traffic stop; they might tell us about the content 
of a television broadcast that triggered FCC penalties; or they might 
tell us about a state’s history of enforcing a challenged law. The process 
can sometimes be arduous, and it can at other times proceed quickly. 
But however the fact-finding process takes place, its underlying 
purpose is the same: generating information about a legal dispute and 
the broader environment in which it operates.19 
Second, courts must identify the applicable law. Call this the task 
of rule identification. In one sense, rule identification in constitutional 
cases is easy to do: if a litigant asserts a constitutional claim, the 
applicable rule is the Constitution itself. But rarely does the abstract 
language of the Constitution provide much in the way of concrete 
guidance. More frequently, that guidance comes from the various 
decision rules of Supreme Court doctrine that specify how to go about 
resolving a given constitutional claim. Equal protection doctrine, for 
instance, instructs courts to apply strict scrutiny when reviewing laws 
that employ race-based classifications;20 Spending Clause doctrine calls 
for courts to apply a multifactor test when reviewing a conditional 
spending program;21 procedural due process doctrine requires courts to 
apply the three-part balancing test from Mathews v. Eldridge22 when 
evaluating the adequacy of procedural safeguards;23 and so forth. For 
frequently litigated issues, one identifies the applicable rule simply by 
looking up the relevant judicial precedents and reciting the standards 
they set forth. Where the precedents are sparser, rule identification 
 
 19. I should note that—perhaps unconventionally—I will sometimes understand the relevant 
facts of a constitutional case to include materials of a formally legal character. For example, in a 
Commerce Clause challenge to a newly enacted piece of federal legislation, my conceptual 
framework would treat the legislation itself as a fact rather than as a rule that is of relevance to 
the constitutional decision. In such a case, after all, the challenged legislation would be operating 
as an object of, rather than source of, the legal analysis that the court conducts, becoming, in 
effect, one of several data points feeding into the question of whether a claimant’s Commerce 
Clause argument should fail or succeed. This is not to say that the challenged legislation could not 
function as a rule in another case; we would understand it to be the governing rule, for instance, 
in a criminal prosecution presenting the question whether a defendant acted in violation of the 
legislation itself. But where the legislation is itself the object of a constitutional inquiry, it is more 
accurately characterized as a fact on which the relevant decision rule operates.  
 20. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (“Accordingly, we 
hold today that all racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local governmental 
actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.”). 
 21. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207–08 (1987) (listing four factors for 
evaluating a conditional spending program). 
 22. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
 23. Id. at 335. 
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might involve the formulation of a new decision rule informed by 
judgments about text, history, structure, policy, and so forth.24 Rule 
identification, in short, begins with the various sources of constitutional 
law and ends with some combination of tests, presumptions, 
formulations, exceptions, and other directives that courts have 
developed to facilitate the implementation of an abstract constitutional 
norm. 
With the law and the facts on the table, a decisionmaker can then 
proceed to apply the former to the latter, thus carrying out the final, 
outcome-determinative task of rule application.25 Is a particular 
government interest “compelling” enough to survive strict scrutiny? If 
so, is a particular race-based classification “narrowly tailored” to serve 
that interest? Is a particular conditional spending program unduly 
“coercive”? Does a given set of procedures satisfy the Mathews v. 
 
 24. More specifically, I understand the rule identification enterprise to encompass two 
different sorts of determinations that courts routinely make. First, the rule identification process 
will sometimes involve the resolution of interpretive questions about the meaning of the 
constitutional text, with courts identifying an operative proposition of constitutional law by 
selecting one out of several plausible readings of a given textual provision. See, e.g., NLRB v. Noel 
Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2561–67 (2014) (reading the phrase “the recess” in the Recess 
Appointments Clause to refer both to intra-session and inter-session recesses of Congress). 
Second, the rule identification process will sometimes involve the creation of judge-made decision 
rules to facilitate the implementation of whatever the operative proposition is identified to be. 
See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444–45 (1966) (setting forth a particularized warning 
requirement as a means of enforcing the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition on compelled 
confessions); see also Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 51 
(2004) (distinguishing between “constitutional operative propositions (essentially, judge-
interpreted constitutional meaning) and constitutional decision rules (rules that direct courts how 
to decide whether a given operative proposition has been, or will be, complied with)”); Richard 
H. Fallon, Jr., Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 54, 57 (1997) 
(contending that the task of “[i]dentifying the ‘meaning’ of the Constitution is not the Court’s 
only function” and that the Court must also “craft doctrine that is driven by the Constitution, but 
does not reflect the Constitution’s meaning precisely”); Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-
Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 95, 96 (2010) (distinguishing between 
“interpretation,” which is “the process (or activity) that recognizes or discovers the linguistic 
meaning or semantic content of the legal text,” and “construction,” which is “the process that 
gives a text legal effect”); David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 190, 207 (1988) (noting that “courts create constitutional doctrine by taking into account 
both the principles and values reflected in the relevant constitutional provisions and institutional 
realities”). For ease of exposition, I will generally refer to the output of the rule identification 
process as a “decision rule” of constitutional doctrine; but I should emphasize that I do not intend 
to suggest that the process is wholly unrelated to the interpretive challenge of extracting meaning 
from the constitutional text. 
 25. See, e.g., Berman, supra note 24, at 35–36 (noting the “mediating function that 
constitutional rules play between the logically prior judicial announcement of constitutional 
meaning and the logically subsequent application of law to facts”); see also id. at 58–59 
(elaborating on this model). 
COENEN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 1/5/2018  3:12 PM 
756  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 67:743 
Eldridge balancing test? To answer these questions, judges must assess 
a case’s factual particularities in light of the various evaluative criteria 
that the applicable decision rule has set forth. And once these 
assessments have been made, a court can cite to the applicable decision 
rule as justifying the outcome it has reached: if the government interest 
is not compelling or the classification is insufficiently tailored, the law 
must be struck down. If the conditional spending program is 
impermissibly coercive, the spending program cannot stand. If the 
government interests outweigh the liberty interests, and if the risk of 
an erroneous deprivation is minimal, a court should uphold the 
procedural rules under review. Rule application marks the stage of the 
inquiry where law and fact come together—the identified decision rule 
takes the identified fact pattern as its input and yields a legal 
disposition as its output. 
Figure 1: Basic Model of Constitutional Adjudication 
All of this is diagrammed above. Every constitutional case starts 
with two fixed points: (1) the Constitution,26 and (2) the world as we 
 
 26. Although my model characterizes the Constitution as the starting point of the rule 
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know it. The rule identification process takes us from the Constitution 
to an operative decision rule, whereas the fact identification process 
extracts from the world a fact pattern to be evaluated under the 
decision rule. The law application process then combines the decision 
rule with the fact pattern to produce the ultimate outcome of the case. 
B. Adding Input Characterization Into the Mix 
Thus far, our model has omitted reference to the characterization 
of constitutional inputs. We can now bring that process into the picture 
by noting that many decision rules require an assessment of something 
other than unvarnished facts about the real world. When, for instance, 
qualified immunity doctrine instructs the courts to evaluate whether a 
violated rule qualifies as “clearly established,”27 the relevant facts will 
not yield a single agreed-upon description of what that relevant rule is. 
Similarly, when substantive due process doctrine instructs the courts to 
determine whether the plaintiff’s liberty interest is fundamental, 
knowing what happened between the plaintiff and the government is 
not the same as knowing what particular liberty interest the plaintiff 
seeks to protect. The fact identification process gives us a detailed 
snapshot of a particular dispute, but the snapshot is not always the 
input that we need. This is where the challenge of characterization 
comes in—courts must organize a case’s fact pattern into terms and 
concepts that the operative decision rule can understand.28 
A further analogy may help to illustrate the idea. Suppose that a 
 
identification inquiry, nothing of much significance for our purposes turns on the question of 
whether the Constitution itself exhausts the content of U.S. constitutional law. See, e.g., Ernest 
A. Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117 YALE L.J. 408, 410 (2007) (“[T]he 
American ‘constitution’ consists of a much wider range of legal materials than the document 
ratified in 1789 and its subsequent amendments.”). The central assumption of the model, rather, 
is that there exists some set of sources of constitutional law—including but not necessarily limited 
to the constitutional text—and that the rule identification process involves the translation of those 
the sources into rules of decision that courts can apply. 
 27. See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (holding that “government 
officials performing discretionary functions . . . generally are shielded from liability for civil 
damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional 
rights of which a reasonable person would have known”). 
 28. This understanding is reminiscent of Mark Kelman’s suggestion that “legal argument has 
two phases,” the first of which, “interpretive construction,” involves “the way we construe a 
factual situation and . . . the way we frame the possible rules to handle the situation,” and the 
second of which, “rational rhetoricism,” involves “the process of presenting the legal conclusions 
that result when interpretive constructs are applied to the ‘facts.’” Kelman, supra note 8, at 591–
92. In a rough sense, the characterization of constitutional inputs may be seen as a form of what 
Kelman calls “interpretive construction,” whereas the evaluation of those inputs in terms of a pre-
established decision rule may be seen as a form of what Kelman calls “rational rhetoricism.” 
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friend asks me whether the opening chord to “A Hard Day’s Night” is 
major or minor in character. Suppose further that I have managed to 
identify all of the individual notes sounding from all of the individual 
instruments at the beginning of the song.29 I have, in other words, 
identified an applicable rule (namely, evaluate whether the chord is 
major or minor) and I have gathered all the relevant facts (the notes 
being played at the beginning of the song). But I am not yet able to 
answer my friend’s question, because the decision rule operates on the 
singular, abstract input of a “chord.” Consequently, before I can 
discern the major or minor nature of the opening chord of “A Hard 
Day’s Night,” I first must restate that collection of notes in the 
conceptual language of a chord. Do the notes comprise a “G-seven 
chord with a suspended fourth”? A “D-minor-11 chord”? An “F-
major-seven-add-9 chord”? Or some other chord altogether? As it 
turns out, these—and many other—labels all offer plausible harmonic 
descriptions of the collection of notes that I hear at the beginning of 
the song,30 and no additional fact finding will shed light on the question 
of which particular description I should employ. I must therefore make 
a characterization choice, tagging one of these descriptions as the 
relevant “chord” to serve as the basis for the answer to my friend’s 
question. 
We can thus visualize the characterization process as a sometimes-
necessary intermediate step between the fact identification and law 
application stages of the decisionmaking process.31 In our example 
 
 29. As it happens, this information only recently became available. See Damian Fanelli, 
Beatles Multitracks Reveal True “A Hard Day’s Night” Opening Chord, GUITAR WORLD (Nov. 
6, 2015), http://www.guitarworld.com/beatles-multitracks-reveal-true-hard-days-night-chord-
video [https://perma.cc/KD8K-SUEE]. 
 30. Compare, e.g., TONY BACON, FUZZ AND FEEDBACK: CLASSICAL GUITAR MUSIC OF 
THE 60’S, at 5 (2000) (characterizing the chord as a Dm7sus4), with DOMINIC PEDLER, THE 
SONGWRITING SECRETS OF THE BEATLES 478–79 (2003) (quoting George Harrison’s 
characterization of the chord as an Fadd9). Whether Harrison’s own characterization of the chord 
should carry special weight is an interesting question, but it is one, alas, that lies outside the scope 
of this Article. 
 31. I should note here that I understand the challenge of input characterization to be 
materially different from what David Faigman has elsewhere called problem of defining the 
“proper frame of reference for deciding constitutional cases.” See FAIGMAN, supra note 18, at 78. 
See generally David L. Faigman, Defining Empirical Frames of Reference in Constitutional Cases: 
Unraveling the As-Applied Versus Facial Distinction in Constitutional Law, 36 HASTINGS CONST. 
L.Q. 631 (2009) (exploring the relationship between liberty and government interests). 
Constitutional outcomes, as Faigman has demonstrated, often depend on what types of factual 
findings the Court should demand when deciding a given case, with the Court sometimes looking 
to findings that are true at the case-specific level and at other times looking to findings that are 
true in a more systemic sense. Faigman’s “frame of reference” question, in other words, goes not 
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above, it was a process that took us from a collection of notes to a 
description of a chord. In law, it is the process that takes us from the 
text and legislative history of a congressional statute to a description of 
the “activity” that the statute regulates; from a transcript of statements 
made by a protester to a description of the “matter” that the protester 
discussed; from data about the history and effects of a regulation to a 
description of the liberty interests and/or government interests that it 
implicates. It takes as its input what we might call a raw fact pattern—
a timeline of events, the text of a challenged law, the testimony of a 
government official—and it generates as its output a characterized 
factual input—a label, concept, or descriptive statement that can be 
plugged into the decision rule we are applying. 
C. Characterization Versus Evaluation 
As the foregoing discussion suggests, what we call the application 
of law to fact often involves—or at least purports to involve—two 
distinct tasks: a characterization of facts into the language of the 
requisite doctrinal input, followed by an evaluation of that input by 
reference to criteria the test sets forth. For instance, when courts apply 
substantive due process doctrine, they must characterize the facts in 
terms of a “right” being asserted, and they must then evaluate the right 
by reference to its overall “fundamentality” or “nonfundamentality.” 
When courts apply qualified immunity doctrine, they must characterize 
the facts in terms of a “violated rule,” and they must then evaluate the 
rule by reference to its “clearly established” or not “clearly 
established” nature. When courts apply the Article III standing test, 
they must characterize the facts in terms of an asserted “injury” of the 
plaintiff, and then evaluate that injury in terms of its concreteness, 
traceability, and redressability. Questions of characterization in this 
sense precede questions of evaluation. To know whether some input 
satisfies the relevant doctrinal criteria, we must first identify, and hence 
characterize, the descriptive contours of the input itself. 
 
 
to the issue of how to characterize a factual input that the doctrine demands, but rather to the 
antecedent question of what sort of factual inputs the doctrine should demand in the first place. 
See FAIGMAN, supra note 18, at 66; see also id. at 195 n.236 (noting that “the concern over what 
frame of reference applies in particular constitutional contexts is fundamentally different from 
the debate sparked by Justice Scalia in Michael H. v. Gerald D.”). 
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Figure 2: Updated Model of Constitutional Adjudication (with 
Characterization Included) 
This posited distinction between characterization and evaluation 
should invite an important point of skepticism: perhaps our attempt to 
differentiate characterization-based questions from evaluation-based 
questions will tend to obscure more than it illuminates, for the simple 
reason that both types of questions ultimately implicate the same big-
picture task of applying law to fact.32 It may be formally correct to 
 
 32. A big-picture, methodological objection to this Article might as well be addressed here. 
Specifically, this objection attacks this Article’s near-exclusive focus on constitutional law as 
arbitrary and unnecessary. Constitutional law, after all, is by no means the only area of law in 
which doctrinal rules require evaluations of abstract conceptual inputs, and there is nothing 
special about constitutional cases qua constitutional cases that would require us to think about 
their characterization problems any different from others. Cf. Michael Coenen, Constitutional 
Privileging, 99 VA. L. REV. 683, 691 (2013) (questioning the utility of the constitutional/ 
nonconstitutional distinction within a variety of doctrinal contexts). To this accusation, I plead 
guilty as charged. Although I do not squarely confront the issue in this Article, my inclination is 
to agree with the claim that characterization problems are by no means unique to the domain of 
constitutional law, see, e.g., Tun-Jen Chiang, The Levels of Abstraction Problem in Patent Law, 
105 NW. L. REV. 1097, 1118 (2011) (evaluating an analogous set of problems that arise from 
patent-law doctrines that require a characterization of the relevant “invention” that a given patent 
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describe the determination that “X is or is not Y” as involving both a 
characterization of the facts in terms of X followed by an evaluation of 
X in terms of Y. But if the first and second steps of the inquiry turn out 
to overlap with one another, then we might as well jettison the 
distinction as unhelpful to the goal of better understanding the 
challenge of constitutional decisionmaking. If, in other words, the 
various difficulties associated with questions of characterization end up 
mirroring the various difficulties associated with questions of 
evaluation, then we should examine those difficulties directly and on 
their own terms, without indulging any surface-level distinctions 
between the contexts in which they arise. 
So, before proceeding further, I want to point out two important 
ways in which questions of characterization differ from questions of 
evaluation, and to suggest that these differences are significant enough 
to warrant the distinction I have drawn. First, unlike questions of 
evaluation, questions of characterization can be both posed and 
answered in purely descriptive terms: they are, on their face, value-
neutral questions of “what,” rather than value-laden questions of 
“whether.” Characterizing the relevant government interest implicated 
by a law does not appear to involve an assessment of the strength of 
the government’s justifications for that law, whereas evaluating the 
importance of that interest does. Characterizing the relevant injury 
suffered by a plaintiff does not require a court to express a judgment 
of the Article III bona fides of the plaintiff’s complaint, whereas 
evaluating the injury’s concreteness and redressability undoubtedly 
does. Obviously, and as we will explore in further detail, this feature of 
characterization questions does not shield them from normative 
influence,33 but it does mean that such choices can mask or obscure 
value-based judgments in a way that their evaluation-based 
 
protects), and I certainly do not intend for this Article’s substantive domain to signify anything to 
the contrary. This Article’s choice of focus derives instead from expositional considerations. A 
comprehensive treatment of characterization problems within all different areas of law strikes me 
as too big a task for a single law review article to take on, and I have thus decided to narrow the 
paper’s focus to a body of cases with which I am already well familiar. Constitutional law, in other 
words, strikes me as as good an area as any other within which to explore the problem of 
characterization, and I do not think much is lost by limiting this Article’s focus in this way. To the 
extent, moreover, that the insights I offer here turn out to be of interest and use to scholars within 
other disciplines, I would regard that outcome as all to the good. 
 33. Cf. Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. 
L. REV. 809, 820 (1935) (noting that “in every field of law we should find the same habit of 
ignoring practical questions of value or of positive fact and taking refuge in ‘legal problems’ which 
can always be answered by manipulating legal concepts in certain approved ways”). 
COENEN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 1/5/2018  3:12 PM 
762  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 67:743 
counterparts cannot. In other words, even if questions of 
characterization turn out to be irreducibly normative, they still can be 
framed and disposed of in such a way as to make their motivating value 
judgments more difficult for the characterizing court to notice and for 
the observing reader to detect. With evaluation-based questions, by 
contrast, the value-based cards are more likely to be out on the table 
for everyone to see. 
Second, questions of characterization—unlike questions of 
evaluation—accommodate a huge range of seemingly plausible 
answers. Evaluation-based questions are typically posed as binary “yes 
or no” questions: “Is the right fundamental?,” “Is the government 
interest compelling?,” “Is the injury concrete?,” etc.34 
Characterization-based questions, by contrast, are typically posed as 
open-ended interpretive inquiries: “What right does this case 
implicate?,” “What government interest does this law serve?,” “What 
injury has plaintiff suffered?,” and so forth. In answering an evaluative 
question, we at least have the luxury of knowing that the answer must 
come out one way or the other: either the characterized input will 
satisfy the relevant criterion or it will not, and there is no other option 
to choose. But to answer a characterization-based question, we must 
begin from the vast universe of descriptively accurate labels that we 
might affix onto a given body of facts. Worse yet, whereas the two 
possible answers to an evaluative question are mutually exclusive of 
one another—a right cannot be both fundamental and nonfundamental 
at the same time— the much higher number of possible answers to 
characterization questions are less obviously so. Descriptively 
speaking, for instance, a substantive due process case can 
simultaneously implicate a “right to same-sex marriage” and a “right 
to marriage,” just as a qualified immunity case can simultaneously 
implicate the “prohibition on abridgments of free speech” and the 
“prohibition on abridgments of employee speech on matters of public 
concern.” That is not to say that questions of evaluation are always 
easier to answer than their characterization-based counterparts. But it 
is to say that, all else equal, evaluation-based questions at least enjoy a 
clarity of framing that their characterization-based counterparts do 
not. 
To be sure, distinguishing between characterization-based 
 
 34. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Analogy in the Supreme Court: Lozman v. City of Riviera 
Beach, Florida, 2013 SUP. CT. REV. 405, 405 (noting that “legal decision making, in its archetypal 
mode, is bivalent”). 
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questions and evaluation-based questions may not always prove to be 
a useful or easy exercise.35 Even so, and as I hope the ensuing 
discussion will reveal, the distinction will often provide helpful means 
of thinking about a range of different problems in a range of different 
doctrinal contexts. 
II.  CHARACTERIZATION PROBLEMS IN CONSTITUTIONAL 
DOCTRINE 
This Part offers a representative but by no means exhaustive 
catalogue of characterization choices implicated by constitutional 
decision rules. Specifically, it highlights decisions in which the Supreme 
Court has relied on a contestable characterization of the facts on the 
way to determining the outcome of a given doctrinal test. Some of the 
Court’s characterization choices, as we will see, are easier to spot than 
others, but all of the examples below illustrate both the widespread 
existence of characterization-based questions in constitutional doctrine 
and the absence of a clear and systematic approach to resolving these 
questions.36 
 
 35. In particular, it will sometimes be debatable whether a decision rule does in fact operate 
on characterized inputs. Consider, for example, the much-debated question of whether the so-
called “individual mandate” of the Affordable Care Act regulated “inactivity” or “activity”—a 
question that five Justices ultimately found relevant to their disposition of the Commerce Clause 
claim presented in NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 522 (2013). Assuming for the moment the 
validity of a rule that withholds from Congress the power to regulate “inactivity” under the 
Commerce Clause, we might well disagree as to whether the application of that rule requires a 
characterization of the facts. As this Article argues below, one might answer this question in the 
affirmative, interpreting the rule the require the reviewing court to characterize out of the facts a 
particular “behavior” regulated by the law, and then to evaluate the active or inactive nature of 
the “behavior” so characterized. For a description of the question in these terms, see infra Part 
II.D. But one might alternatively understand the determination in characterization-free terms; 
perhaps, for instance, the operative decision rule simply instructs the court to ask whether a 
challenged statute is or is not behavior-forcing, in which case a characterization of the regulated 
behavior might not in fact be warranted. The ambiguity, in short, stems from the Court’s failure 
to specify what exactly it understood the input of the operative decision rule to be: either the input 
is the statute itself, or the input is the behavior regulated by the statute (which does require a 
characterization choice). In this way can the seemingly straightforward distinction between 
decision rules that do and do not require characterization choices tend to break down at the 
margins.  
 36. This Part will also reveal that the Court itself often blends together its characterization-
based findings with its evaluation-based determinations. For example, rather than characterize 
the relevant right whose fundamentality must be evaluated and then explain why that right does 
or does not qualify as fundamental, the Court will sometimes simply catalogue reasons as to why 
a case does or does not implicate a fundamental right without ever specifying what exactly it 
understood that fundamental right to be. In other words, courts will often determine and justify 
the outcome of a decision rule while failing to identify the precise contours of the particular input 
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A. Characterizing Rights 
Characterization problems frequently arise when litigants allege 
infringements of unenumerated rights under the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause. The Clause has long been 
understood to contain a substantive component,37 according to which 
courts must apply heightened scrutiny to government action that 
deprives individuals of a fundamental right. The fundamentality or 
nonfundamentality of the right asserted thus carries major implications 
for the success or failure of a substantive due process claim, and courts 
must, and often do, devote substantial analysis to the question of 
whether the asserted right does or does not qualify as fundamental. But 
a Court cannot render this assessment until it has rendered a 
characterization of the relevant “right” to be assessed. Substantive due 
process analysis therefore must begin, as the Court itself has 
acknowledged, with a “‘careful description’ of the asserted 
fundamental liberty interest.”38 
This is no easy task. A well-known illustration of its difficulties 
comes from Michael H. v. Gerald D.39 Michael H. believed, on the basis 
of strong DNA evidence, that he was the father of a child born to a 
woman married to another man.40 A California court had denied his 
request for visitation rights, citing to a state evidentiary presumption 
 
they have evaluated.  
To the extent this is so, it might provide reason to question the descriptive validity of an 
adjudicatory model that conceptualizes “characterization” and “evaluation” as independent, 
sequential steps. Certainly, it is important not to take the model as an airtight description of how 
courts actually apply law to fact. Even so, the model still accords with descriptive reality insofar 
as it describes what the operative decision rules themselves purport to require. When we are told 
to evaluate the Y-ness of X, we cannot perform that task without first determining what X is, and 
that fact is in and of itself descriptively significant. There can be a difference, in other words, 
between what a decision rule instructs courts to do and what courts say they are doing when 
applying that rule, but misalignments between these two things do not in any way falsify our 
claims we might make about the rules themselves. To be sure, those misalignments may 
themselves be significant. They might suggest, for instance, that courts are making the required 
characterization choices internally, implicitly, or altogether subconsciously. They might also 
suggest that a nominally operative decision rule is in fact inoperative, failing to guide or constrain 
judicial decisionmaking as it purports to do. But those conclusions cast no doubt on the more 
basic descriptive suggestion that I wish to offer here—namely, that many existing rules of 
constitutional doctrine on their own terms require courts to engage in the difficult business of 
characterizing inputs out of the facts. 
 37. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2597 (2015).  
 38. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 
292, 302 (1993)). 
 39. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989). 
 40. Id. at 113–14 (plurality opinion). 
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that “the issue of a wife cohabitating with her husband . . . is 
conclusively presumed to be a child of the marriage.”41 In response, 
Michael H. sought judicial invalidation of the presumption on 
substantive due process grounds, claiming an unjustified government 
infringement of a fundamental right.42 A fractured Court denied his 
claim, with the Justices disagreeing about, among other things, how to 
characterize the liberty interest Michael H. sought to vindicate.43 
According to Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion, Michael H. had invoked 
an interest in “assert[ing] parental rights over a child born into a 
woman’s existing marriage with another man”44—an interest that was 
not “so deeply embedded within our traditions as to be a fundamental 
right.”45 Justice Brennan and the other dissenters disagreed, arguing 
that Michael H. was seeking recognition of the “parent-child 
relationship”—an interest that “was among the first that this Court 
acknowledged in its cases defining the ‘liberty’ protected by the 
Constitution.”46 One group of Justices, in other words, saw the case as 
concerning the rights of “adulterous natural father[s],”47 whereas 
another group of Justices saw the case as concerning the right of 
“parenthood,” full stop.48 With these differing characterizations 
adopted, the Justices reached differing conclusions as to whether 
Michael H. should win. 
Characterization choices also played a significant role in shaping 
the Court’s evaluation of state antisodomy laws under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The Court originally upheld one such law, reasoning in 
Bowers v. Hardwick49 that the “right to engage in homosexual sodomy” 
did not qualify as sufficiently fundamental to implicate heightened due 
process protections.50 But some twenty years later, the Court reversed 
 
 41. Id. at 115 (citing CAL. EVID. CODE § 621(a) (West 1989)). 
 42. Id. at 116. 
 43. Id. at 121–31 (plurality opinion); see id. at 132 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part); id. at 
133 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 142 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 44. Id. at 125 (plurality opinion). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 142 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also id. at 157 (White, J., dissenting) (“Prior cases 
here have recognized the liberty interest of a father in his relationship with his child.”). 
 47. Id. at 127 n.6 (plurality opinion). 
 48. Id. at 139 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 49. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 50. Id. at 191; see id. at 196 (Burger, J., concurring) (“I write separately to underscore my 
view that in constitutional terms there is no such thing as a fundamental right to commit 
homosexual sodomy.”). But see id. at 204 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“The case before us 
implicates both the decisional and the spatial aspects of the right to privacy.”). 
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course in Lawrence v. Texas,51 finding in Bowers a “failure to 
appreciate the extent of the liberty at stake.”52 Rather than implicate 
the “right to engage in consensual sodomy,” the Court instead 
characterized the right as involving “the most private human conduct, 
sexual behavior, and in the most private of places, the home.”53 Put 
differently, the plaintiffs in Lawrence sought not just to engage in a 
particular form of sexual activity, but rather to develop a “personal 
bond that is more enduring.”54 The Court in Lawrence concluded that 
its earlier decision in Bowers had thus “misapprehended the claim of 
liberty there presented to it.”55 
Consider also the Court’s decision in Washington v. Glucksberg—
described in this Article’s Introduction. A group of doctors and 
patients sought facial invalidation of a Washington law prohibiting 
physician-assisted suicide of terminally ill patients.56 Among the first 
issues the Court confronted was the nature of the liberty interest at 
stake: was it a “right to die,”57 a “liberty to choose how to die,”58 a right 
to “control of one’s final days,”59 a “right to choose a humane, dignified 
death,”60 or something else entirely? Confronting this question, and 
emphasizing the Court’s “tradition of carefully formulating the interest 
at stake in substantive due-process cases,”61 the Court ultimately 
settled upon a formulation based on the “right to commit suicide which 
itself includes a right to assistance in doing so.”62 Having framed the 
right in these terms, the Court then proceeded to note that “[t]he 
 
 51. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S 558 (2003). 
 52. Id. at 567. To be sure, the Court in Lawrence was not altogether clear as to whether the 
(recharacterized) “liberty interest” did in fact qualify as fundamental. See id. at 586 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (noting the absence of an explicit declaration as to the asserted right’s 
fundamentality). But even though the Court never expressly declared that the plaintiff’s liberty 
interests were fundamental, it left strong signals that suggested as much. See Laurence H. Tribe, 
Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” That Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 
1893, 1935 (2004) (“The Court left no doubt about its understanding of the fundamental claim to 
‘liberty’ being advanced in Lawrence . . . .”). 
 53. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 707–08 (1997). 
 57. Id. at 709 (quoting Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 816 (9th Cir. 1996) 
(en banc)). 
 58. Id. at 722 (quoting Brief for Respondents at 7, Washington, 521 U.S. 702 (No. 96-110)). 
 59. Id. (quoting Brief for Respondents at 7, Washington, 521 U.S. 702 (No. 96-110)). 
 60. Id. (quoting Brief for Respondents at 15, Washington, 521 U.S. 702 (No. 96-110)).  
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 723. 
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history of the law’s treatment of assisted suicide in this country has 
been and continues to be one of the rejection of nearly all efforts to 
permit it.”63 And that fact in turn led to the conclusion “that the 
asserted ‘right’ to assistance in committing suicide is not a fundamental 
liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause.”64 
Contested characterizations of rights recently took center stage in 
litigation concerning the constitutionality of same-sex marriage bans.65 
Faced with the question whether the Due Process Clause prohibited 
states from denying marriage licenses to same-sex couples, lower court 
judges had reached different results predicated on differing 
characterizations of the right that same-sex marriage bans abridged. 
Some judges in particular had characterized the relevant right as a 
“right to same-sex marriage,” and they had further concluded that this 
was not a right whose “fundamentality” could be demonstrated.66 
Other judges, by contrast, characterized the right as a “right to 
marry,”67 whose fundamentality was made manifest by prior Supreme 
Court decisions such as Loving v. Virginia,68 Turner v. Safley,69 and 
Zablocki v. Redhail.70 When the issue reached the Supreme Court, a 
majority of the Justices opted for the broader of the two 
characterizations, explaining the choice as follows: 
[The respondents] assert the petitioners do not seek to exercise the 
right to marry but rather a new and nonexistent “right to same-sex 
marriage.” Glucksberg did insist that liberty under the Due Process 
Clause must be defined in a most circumscribed manner, with central 
reference to specific historical practices. Yet while that approach may 
have been appropriate for the asserted right there involved 
(physician-assisted suicide), it is inconsistent with the approach this 
Court has used in discussing other fundamental rights, including 
marriage and intimacy. Loving did not ask about a “right to 
 
 63. Id. at 728. 
 64. Id. 
 65. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015) (discussing competing 
characterizations of the right to same-sex marriage). 
 66. See, e.g., DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 411 (6th Cir. 2014) (“Loving addressed, and 
rightly corrected, an unconstitutional eligibility requirement for marriage; it did not create a new 
definition of marriage.”). 
 67. See, e.g., Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 376 (4th Cir. 2014) (“Because we conclude that 
the fundamental right to marry encompasses the right to same-sex marriage, Glucksberg’s analysis 
is inapplicable here.”). 
 68. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 69. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987). 
 70. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978). 
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interracial marriage”; Turner did not ask about a “right of inmates to 
marry”; and Zablocki did not ask about a “right of fathers with unpaid 
child support duties to marry.” Rather, each case inquired about the 
right to marry in its comprehensive sense, asking if there was a 
sufficient justification for excluding the relevant class from the right. 
  That principle applies here.71 
The Obergefell dissenters, by contrast, saw things differently. In 
their view, the “‘right to marry’ cases stand for the important but 
limited proposition that particular restrictions on access to marriage as 
traditionally defined violate due process.”72 The relevant case law, in 
other words, “sa[id] nothing at all about a right to make a State change 
its definition of marriage, which is the right that petitioners actually 
seek here.”73 That being so, the right the plaintiffs sought—namely, a 
right “to make a State change its definition of marriage”—could not be 
shown to be fundamental within the meaning of the Due Process 
Clause.74 
In one sense, this dispute went to the import of prior precedents: 
the Justices in the Obergefell majority saw the Court’s past “right to 
marriage” cases as enshrining a broader set of constitutional 
protections than did their colleagues in dissent. In another important 
sense, however, the Justices’ dispute stemmed from differing 
characterizations of the facts before them in terms of the right the 
plaintiffs had invoked. Both camps in Obergefell could agree, and in 
fact did agree, that Loving, Turner, and Zablocki established a 
fundamental right to marry, but they could not agree on whether that 
was the right at issue in Obergefell itself. Each side, looking at the same 
set of facts, characterized out of those facts substantially different 
descriptions of the liberty interest being asserted. And with these 
divergent characterizations of the liberty interest on the table, 
divergent conclusions as to its fundamentality naturally followed suit. 
B. Characterizing Rules 
Characterization problems can also arise within the law of 
qualified immunity, which generally shields public officials from 
 
 71. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015) (first citing Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 
752–73 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring in judgment); then citing Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 789–92 
(Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment)). 
 72. Id. at 2619 (Roberts, J., dissenting). 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
COENEN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 1/5/2018  3:12 PM 
2018] CHARACTERIZING CONSTITUTIONAL INPUTS 769 
liability for actions that, though unlawful, did not at the time of their 
occurrence violate “clearly established statutory or constitutional 
rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”75 The 
standard exists to measure the “objective legal reasonableness” of 
official conduct, which is to be “assessed in light of the legal rules that 
were clearly established at the time it was taken.”76 This rule’s 
applicability, as the Court has noted, “depends substantially upon the 
level of generality at which the relevant ‘legal rule’ is to be identified.”77 
The broader the characterization of the violated rule, the easier it is to 
demonstrate a violation of clearly established law; the narrower the 
characterization, the more difficult it becomes to do the same.78 
Consequently, characterization choices regarding the identity of the 
rule that an official is alleged to have violated can play a major role in 
shaping courts’ dispositions of qualified immunity cases. 
Consider Mullenix v. Luna.79 During the course of a car chase, a 
Texas state trooper fatally shot the driver of a car.80 The district court 
denied summary judgment to the trooper, and the Fifth Circuit 
affirmed, with both courts finding that material issues of fact existed as 
to the question whether the officer’s actions violated clearly 
established Fourth Amendment law.81 Operative Fourth Amendment 
doctrine, the Fifth Circuit explained, held in no uncertain terms that 
“the use of deadly force, absent a sufficiently substantial and 
immediate threat, violated the Fourth Amendment.”82 The plaintiffs 
had adduced facts suggesting that the victim’s conduct had not given 
rise to a “substantial and immediate” threat, the court reasoned, 
 
 75. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). It bears noting that the qualified immunity 
rule is not a “constitutional” rule, as it does not derive directly from the Constitution itself. See 
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 241 (1974) (describing qualified immunity as a “creature of the 
common law”). But because the rule remains relevant to a wide variety of different constitutional 
cases, I have chosen to include it within the scope of my analysis here. 
 76. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 244 (2009) (quoting Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 
614 (1999)).  
 77. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987). 
 78. See Karen M. Blum, Qualified Immunity: A User’s Manual, 26 IND. L. REV. 187, 200 
(1993) (“In most cases, the answer to the question of whether the right was clearly established 
will be a function of how narrowly the ‘contours’ of the particular right are drawn when framing 
the inquiry.”). 
 79. Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305 (2015) (per curiam). 
 80. Id. at 306−07. 
 81. See id. at 307 (“[T]here are genuine issues of fact as to whether Trooper Mullenix acted 
recklessly, or acted as a reasonable, trained peace officer would have acted in the same or similar 
circumstances.” (quoting Luna v. Mullenix, 773 F.3d 712, 725 (5th Cir. 2014))). 
 82. Luna, 773 F.3d at 725. 
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meaning that the officer violated the clearly established Fourth 
Amendment rule that “it is unreasonable for a police officer to use 
deadly force against a fleeing felon who does not pose a sufficient 
threat of harm.”83 
The Supreme Court reversed. It did not necessarily disagree with 
the Fifth Circuit’s conclusion that the Fourth Amendment clearly 
prohibited the use of deadly force in the absence of a “substantial and 
immediate threat,” nor did it necessarily disagree with the Fifth 
Circuit’s conclusion that the officer had in fact exercised deadly force 
in the absence of a substantial threat.84 But it did disagree with the 
lower courts’ conclusion that the relevant rule implicated by the facts 
was a general Fourth Amendment prohibition on the use of deadly 
force in nonthreatening situations.85 Instead, the Court held that the 
relevant rule should have been characterized with greater particularity, 
incorporating into its content the specific circumstances faced by the 
defendant when choosing to fire his weapon.86 With the rule so 
characterized, its clearly established nature could hardly be shown, 
given that past case law had “not clearly established that deadly force 
is inappropriate in response to conduct like [the victim’s].”87 In other 
words, it may have been true that Fourth Amendment doctrine plainly 
prohibited the exercise of deadly force in the absence of a substantial 
threat, but Fourth Amendment doctrine did not plainly prohibit the 
exercise of deadly force under the circumstances the defendant faced. 
Thus, the differing conclusions of the Fifth Circuit and the Supreme 
Court in Mullenix derived largely from differing characterizations of 
the relevant rule whose clearly established nature was at issue in the 
case.88 
 
 83. Id. (quoting Lytle v. Bexar Cty., 560 F.3d 404, 417 (5th Cir. 2009)).  
 84. Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. at 308. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 309 (“The relevant inquiry is whether existing precedent placed the conclusion that 
Mullenix acted unreasonably in these circumstances ‘beyond debate.’ The general principle that 
deadly force requires a sufficient threat hardly settles this matter.” (citation omitted) (quoting 
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011))).  
 87. Id. at 311. 
 88. Disputes over the proper characterization of federal rules are not unique to qualified 
immunity determinations. Similar issues have arisen in the context of federal collateral review, 
where various procedural and remedial standards require federal courts to investigate the clarity 
of the rule underlying a petitioner’s claim for postconviction relief. In Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 
227 (1990), for instance, the Court confronted a retroactivity question stemming from a habeas 
petitioner’s Eighth Amendment challenge to a capital sentence. Id. at 232. During sentencing 
proceedings, the prosecutor had told the jury that its sentencing determination would represent 
only an “initial step” in the sentencing process and that a juror voting for death should not “feel 
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C. Characterizing Government Interests 
Equal protection doctrine, substantive due process doctrine, free 
speech doctrine, and various other areas of law often call upon courts 
to employ some form of means/ends analysis in assessing the validity 
of challenged government action.89 The requisite doctrinal standards 
vary—the strict scrutiny test requires that the government interest be 
“compelling” and that the challenged action be “narrowly tailored” to 
that interest; the intermediate scrutiny test requires that the interest be 
“important” and that the challenged action be “substantially tailored” 
to that interest; the rational basis test requires that the interest be 
merely “legitimate” and that the challenged action be “rationally 
related” to that interest—but the overarching structure of the inquiry 
is largely the same. In particular, all forms of means/ends analysis 
require at their outset a characterization of the relevant government 
interest whose importance and relatedness to the challenged law may 
 
like you are the one . . . pulling the switch.” Id. at 231. The jury imposed the death sentence, and 
the sentence was upheld on direct appeal. Id. at 232. 
The retroactivity issue in Sawyer centered on a case called Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 
320 (1985), decided approximately one year after Sawyer’s conviction had become final. Caldwell, 
according to the Court in Sawyer, had held that “the Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition 
of a death sentence by a sentencer that has been led to the false belief that the responsibility for 
determining the appropriateness of the defendant’s capital sentence rests elsewhere,” Sawyer, 497 
U.S. at 233 (citing Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 328−29); Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 342 (O’Connor, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment), and its holding therefore cast doubt on the 
validity of Sawyer’s capital sentence. Sawyer, 497 U.S. at 233−34. But because Caldwell postdated 
Sawyer’s conviction, Sawyer could not receive the benefit of Caldwell itself; rather, he needed to 
show that Caldwell’s holding (and thus the unconstitutionality of his sentence) had been “dictated 
by” prior precedents in existence at the time of his conviction. Id. at 234 (quoting Teague v. Lane, 
498 U.S. 288, 301 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring)). Whether that was so, however, depended 
largely on how one chose to characterize the relevant rule that the prosecutor allegedly violated 
in Sawyer’s case. Sawyer (and, ultimately, the dissenting Justices) sought to characterize the 
prosecutor’s conduct as subverting the “principle of reliability in capital sentencing,” a principle 
that long predated the decision in Caldwell itself. Id. at 247 (Marshall, J., dissenting). But a 
majority of Justices rejected that characterization, believing it to be cast at too high a “level of 
generality.” Id. at 236 (majority opinion). To these Justices, the relevant rule that the prosecutor 
had violated was the holding of Caldwell itself—a prohibition on forms of “prosecutorial 
comment” that diminished the jury’s sense of responsibility for imposing a sentence of death. Id. 
And with the relevant characterization thus adopted, the majority could easily conclude that 
Sawyer’s claim for relief was Teague-barred. Cases prior to Caldwell may have emphasized the 
importance of reliability in capital sentencing, but “no case prior to Caldwell invalidated a 
prosecutorial argument as impermissible under the Eighth Amendment.” Id. (emphasis added). 
Thus, Sawyer’s claim for relief depended squarely on Caldwell and not its predecessor cases, 
which in turn meant that Sawyer’s habeas petition relied on a rule that was “new.” 
 89. For a general overview of the various contexts in which this test arises, see Michael 
Coenen, More Restrictive Alternatives, 96 N.C. L. REV. 1, 19–41.  
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then be assessed.90 In other words, to know whether a law is sufficiently 
related to the achievement of a sufficiently important government 
interest, courts first must characterize out of the facts the particular 
government interest to be evaluated. 
Despite the frequency with which the Court engages in 
means/ends inquiries of this sort, it seldom explains the 
characterization choices it makes regarding the relevant government 
interest at stake. Much more often, the Court simply states without 
explanation the interest that it understands a law to serve, and then 
investigates with far more thoroughness the question of how that 
government interest fares under the requisite means/ends criteria.91 
This is a problem, because, as various commentators have suggested, 
many government actions lend themselves to a host of different 
interest-based characterizations, and these different characterizations 
may carry different implications for the overall outcome of the 
means/ends test.92 In other words, means/ends analysis may be sensitive 
to threshold characterization choices that the Court seldom if ever 
explains. 
Richard Fallon has persuasively demonstrated this point by 
reference to the question whether public universities violate the Equal 
Protection Clause by considering race as a factor in student 
admissions.93 Operative Supreme Court doctrine provides that such 
programs should pass muster only if narrowly tailored to serve a 
compelling government interest. To apply that test, we must know 
something about what sorts of interest do and do not qualify as 
compelling and we must have some general sense of how close the 
means/ends fit must be to satisfy the narrow-tailoring requirement as 
 
 90. See Fox, supra note 6, at 274 (“The Constitution imparts no inventory of . . . interests that 
the state may or must pursue, and a particular such interest can be described in any number of 
ways. Courts therefore face a choice about how to characterize the interest(s) that a contested 
state action advances.”). 
 91. See, e.g. Fallon, supra note 6, at 1321 (noting the Court’s “astonishingly casual” approach 
to the question). 
 92. See, e.g., id.; see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-23, 
at 983 (2d ed. 1988) (suggesting that the Court in United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), 
adopted a “generous definition of a governmental purpose,” which “guaranteed that the law 
under review would indeed be the ‘least restrictive means’ to the end being pursued”); Thomas 
C. Berg, What Hath Congress Wrought? An Interpretive Guide to the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act, 39 VILL. L. REV. 1, 40−41 (1994) (noting that “[m]any social goals appear 
‘compelling’ when they are inflated to the highest level of generality” and that “too many free 
exercise decisions have blindly accepted the government’s characterization of its interest at the 
highest level of generality”). 
 93. Fallon, supra note 6, at 1323−24. 
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well. But before even getting to these questions, we must settle on a 
characterization of the relevant government interest underlying the 
program under review. And this characterization choice is by no means 
an easy one to make. As Fallon suggests, even once we have narrowed 
our focus to matters of educational diversity, the range of plausible 
characterization choices remains quite wide: 
Is [the relevant interest] an interest in racial diversity or, instead, an 
interest in diversity of perspectives for which racial background may 
function as evidence, but evidence of only limited weight? A further 
complication arises if it would be possible for a university to achieve 
diversity without affirmative action if, for example, it reduced its 
reliance on grades and test scores as admissions criteria. Is the 
government’s compelling interest one that embraces both retaining 
high academic distinction and achieving diversity? Finally, because 
diversity is inherently a matter of degree, the question emerges 
whether the government’s interest should be defined as one in 
achieving diversity per se, or whether, instead, it should be regarded 
as one in attaining particular levels or increments of diversity? In 
other words, is there a compelling interest in moving from one level 
of diversity (that is more than zero) to another, higher level?94 
Our choice among these varying characterizations of the relevant 
government interest may in turn affect our conclusions about its overall 
weightiness and closeness of fit to whatever set of admissions criteria 
the challenged program employs. In this way, Fallon argues, “it will 
frequently be crucial how the government’s interest is defined.”95 
To take another example, consider the Supreme Court’s recent 
opinion in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project.96 There, the Court 
rejected a First Amendment challenge to the federal “material 
support” statute, considering in particular the statute’s application to 
aid organizations seeking to “facilitate only the lawful, nonviolent 
purposes” of various foreign groups the State Department had 
designated as terrorist organizations.97 The challengers successfully 
persuaded the Court to apply a heightened form of means/ends 
analysis in evaluating the law’s application to them. But the Court 
ultimately found the ban to be justified in light of a governmental 
“objective of the highest order”—namely, “the Government’s interest 
 
 94. Id. at 1324 (footnotes omitted) (citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003)). 
 95. Id. at 1323. 
 96. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010). 
 97. Id. at 8−9. 
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in combatting terrorism.”98 And while the Court devoted a significant 
amount of attention to the question of why the law proved necessary 
to the achievement of this interest,99 it devoted no attention whatsoever 
to the question of why the interest should have been characterized in 
this way. The relevant interest, after all, might alternatively have been 
characterized as that of “undermining the operations of foreign 
organizations designated as terrorist groups,” “prohibiting outside 
assistance to such organizations,” “cutting off support for the lawful, 
nonviolent activities of such organizations,” or “cutting off the 
plaintiffs’ support for the lawful nonviolent activities of such 
organizations,” and these alternative interests might not have qualified 
as weighty enough to justify the infringement of speech that the 
plaintiffs endured. And yet, the Court offered no explanation as to why 
its preferred characterization of the government interest was in fact the 
most appropriate. 
D. Characterizing Activities 
Characterization problems have also emerged in cases concerning 
Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce. According to the 
Court’s holdings in United States v. Lopez100 and United States v. 
Morrison,101 Congress may regulate “economic” activities, which, when 
taken in the aggregate, have a “substantial effect[]” on interstate 
commerce.102 Whether a congressional enactment is consistent with the 
Commerce Clause will thus depend, at least in part, on “whether an 
intrastate activity is commercial or noncommercial” in nature.103 This 
question is difficult enough to answer on its own terms, but it becomes 
even more vexing when one realizes that it will not always be clear how 
to characterize the activity whose economic or noneconomic nature 
must be determined.104 
 
 98. Id. at 28−29. 
 99. Id. at 27−40. 
 100. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).  
 101. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
 102. See id. at 611 (“[I]n those cases where we have sustained federal regulation of intrastate 
activity based upon the activity’s substantial effects on interstate commerce, the activity in 
question has been some sort of economic endeavor.”); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560 (“Where economic 
activity substantially affects interstate commerce, legislation regulating that activity will be 
sustained.”). 
 103. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 566.  
 104. See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Medical Marijuana Case: A Commerce Clause Counter-
Revolution?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 879, 904 (2005) (noting that “the ‘substantial effects’ test 
depends on two utterly subjective judgments,” one of which “concerns the level of generality at 
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Consider the facts of Lopez itself. The Gun Free School Zones 
Act criminalized the possession of firearms in a school zone. In the 
view of the Lopez majority, the regulated activity was obviously 
noncommercial, for the simple reason that “[t]he possession of a gun 
in a local school zone is in no sense an economic activity.”105 But to the 
dissenters, that conclusion was not so straightforward. The majority, 
according to the dissent, “clearly cannot intend . . . to focus narrowly 
on an act of gun possession standing by itself,” because the Court had 
in prior cases allowed Congress to regulate “specific transaction[s]” 
that were not in and of themselves commercial.106 At the same time, “if 
the majority instead mean[t] to distinguish generally among broad 
categories of activities,” its conclusions regarding the noncommercial 
nature of the regulated activity would have become much harder to 
defend.107 The relevant activity, after all, could alternatively have been 
characterized as the “endangerment of school safety,” “the disruption 
of educational services,” or perhaps even the “interference of 
operations at a job-training facility,” and with the regulated activity 
more broadly characterized, application of the commercial/ 
noncommercial distinction might have come out the other way.108 Gun 
possession might not bear an important relationship to labor 
productivity, but education certainly does. And if the law had been 
characterized as an education-focused measure, rather than gun-
related measure, then a different conclusion should have followed, 
given that Congress “could rationally conclude that schools fall on the 
commercial side of the line.”109 
 
which the regulated activity is characterized”); Robert A. Schapiro & William W. Buzbee, 
Unidimensional Federalism: Power and Perspective in Commerce Clause Adjudication, 88 
CORNELL L. REV. 1199, 1252 (2003) (“The Supreme Court exercises a . . . political and judgment-
laden power when it selects a single, constitutionally relevant ‘activity’ for purposes of its 
Commerce Clause analysis.”). 
 105. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567. 
 106. Id. at 628 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism: 
United States v. Lopez, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 125, 204 (“[I]f one defines the activity that narrowly, 
then it is unclear how, for example, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 gets upheld. For there, one could 
have defined the activity as ‘discriminating’ and then asked whether discriminating is ‘commercial 
or not.’”). 
 107. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 628−29 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[I]f the majority instead means to 
distinguish generally among broad categories of activities . . . then, as a practical matter, the line 
becomes almost impossible to draw.”).  
 108. See Schapiro & Buzbee, supra note 104, at 1259 (noting that “[i]n Lopez, the Court could 
have focused on the business aspects of education, the business of guns or even illegal guns, 
defendant Lopez’s plan to sell a gun in the school, or the many ripple effects of school quality and 
safety on economic vitality” (footnote omitted)).  
 109. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 629 (Breyer, J., dissenting). To this point, the majority responded that 
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Characterization-related disputes also arose in Gonzales v. 
Raich.110 There the Court rejected a Commerce Clause challenge to the 
federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA), brought by individuals 
involved in the personal cultivation of medicinal marijuana.111 
Distinguishing the case from Lopez and Morrison, Justice Stevens had 
no trouble identifying a regulated activity that was economic in 
nature.112 As he explained, “[t]he CSA is a statute that regulates the 
production, distribution, and consumption of commodities for which 
there is an established, and lucrative, interstate market. Prohibiting the 
intrastate possession or manufacture of an article of commerce is a 
rational (and commonly utilized) means of regulating commerce in that 
product.”113 But to Justice O’Connor in dissent, the majority had 
mischaracterized the activity implicated by the case, suggesting instead 
that the inquiry should have focused on “[t]he homegrown cultivation 
and personal possession and use of marijuana for medicinal 
purposes.”114 Thus did the Justices’ disagreement in Raich as to the 
economic or noneconomic nature of the activity in question depend 
upon understandings of what that activity was. The majority 
characterized the relevant activity as the entire class of behavior 
covered by the CSA (the “production, distribution, and consumption 
of commodities”),115 whereas the dissenters saw it as the narrower 
behavior in which the plaintiffs themselves had engaged (i.e., “[t]he 
 
“depending on the level of generality, any activity can be looked upon as commercial.” Id. at 565 
(majority opinion). And Justice Breyer’s rationale therefore “lack[ed] any real limits,” because 
similarly general characterizations could always be used to sustain any enactment along similar 
lines. Id. 
 110. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005). 
 111. Id. at 6, 9. 
 112. Id. at 25 (“Unlike those at issue in Lopez and Morrison, the activities regulated by the 
CSA are quintessentially economic.”).  
 113. Id. at 26; see also Michael C. Dorf, Commerce, Death Panels, and Broccoli: Or Why the 
Activity/Inactivity Distinction in the Health Care Case Was Really About the Right to Bodily 
Integrity, 29 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 897, 907 (2013) (“[B]y defining the relevant activity in Raich as 
the consumption of marijuana, the Court was able to analogize the case closely to [Wickard 
v.Filburn], where the law aimed to limit the consumption of home-grown wheat by people like 
Filburn.”). 
 114. Raich, 545 U.S. at 50 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); see also Pushaw, supra note 104, at 904 
(noting that “Justice O’Connor characterized the relevant activity narrowly” whereas Justice 
Stevens “described the CSA broadly as governing the production, possession, and use of drugs”); 
Ernest A. Young, Just Blowing Smoke? Politics, Doctrine, and the Federalist Revival After 
Gonzales v. Raich, 2005 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 23 (“The characterization problem in Raich was 
reminiscent of the classic ‘level of generality’ problem arising in the definition of fundamental 
rights under the Due Process Clause.”). 
 115. Raich, 545 U.S. at 18, 26. 
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homegrown cultivation and personal possession and use of marijuana 
for medicinal purposes”).116 And these different characterizations of 
the relevant activity each supported their own respective conclusions 
as to its economic or noneconomic nature. 
Activity-based characterization choices have also accompanied 
applications of the federalism canon of statutory construction, which 
instructs courts to disfavor readings of congressional statutes that 
would authorize action at “the outer limits of Congress’ power.”117 In 
Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States Army 
Corps of Engineers,118 the Corps claimed regulatory authority over a 
landfill project that threatened the habitats of several species of 
migratory birds, citing to Section 404 of the federal Clean Water Act. 
In the course of rejecting the Corps’ claim of statutory authority, the 
Court pointed to the “serious constitutional problems” that might 
result from construing the statute in the Corps’ favor.119 These 
problems would arise, the Court explained, because “[p]ermitting [the 
Corps] to claim federal jurisdiction over ponds and mudflats falling 
within the ‘Migratory Bird Rule’ would result in a significant 
impingement of the States’ traditional and primary power over land 
and water use.”120 That argument, however, rested on a contestable 
characterization of the activity that the Corps sought to regulate. If one 
characterized the relevant activity as “land and water use,” then one 
could make a case that the Corps was attempting to transgress a subject 
of traditional state regulation. But why not alternatively characterize 
the relevant activity as, say, the “endangerment of migratory birds,” 
the “destruction of [an] aquatic migratory bird habitat,”121 the 
“discharge of fill material into water,” or some other form of 
 
 116. Id. at 50 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); see also id. at 68 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“By 
defining the class [of activities] at a high level of generality (as the intrastate manufacture and 
possession of marijuana), the majority overlooks that individuals authorized by state law to 
manufacture and possess medical marijuana exert no demonstrable effect on the interstate drug 
market.”). 
 117. See Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 172, 174 (2001) 
(“Where an administrative interpretation of a statute invokes the outer limits of Congress’ power, 
we expect a clear indication that Congress intended that result.”).  
 118. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001). 
 119. Id. at 173. 
 120. Id. at 174. 
 121. Id. at 195 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The destruction of [an] aquatic migratory bird 
habitat, like so many other environmental problems, is an action in which the benefits (e.g., a new 
landfill) are disproportionately local, while many of the costs (e.g., fewer migratory birds) are 
widely dispersed and often borne by citizens living in other States.”). 
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interference with traditionally federal regulatory interests? Whether 
one saw a federalism problem in Solid Waste, in other words, depended 
on how one chose to characterize the activity being regulated.122 
Consider finally the five-Justice determination in NFIB v. 
Sebelius123 that the Commerce Clause did not authorize enactment of 
the Affordable Care Act’s “individual mandate.”124 In contrast to 
Lopez, which turned on the noneconomic nature of the activity under 
regulation, the commerce-power issue in NFIB turned on the question 
of whether the individual mandate regulated “activity” as opposed to 
“inactivity.”125 NFIB thus posed an interesting variation on the 
characterization choice that the Court had earlier confronted: rather 
than identify an activity whose economic or noneconomic nature would 
then be decided, the Justices had to identify a relevant form of behavior 
governed by the law, and then decide whether that behavior qualified 
as any sort of activity at all. Five Justices opted for the “inactivity” 
conclusion, with Chief Justice Roberts reasoning that the mandate 
simply “compels individuals to become active in commerce by 
purchasing a product,”126 and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and 
Alito reasoning that the mandate “impressed into service third 
parties.”127 But to the remaining Justices, it was hardly self-evident that 
the relevant behavior should be characterized as the inactive 
nonpurchase of health insurance. After all, they pointed out, “it is 
possible to restate most actions as corresponding inactions with the 
same effect,”128 and the nonpurchase of health could therefore easily 
 
 122. See Schapiro & Buzbee, supra note 104, at 1260 (calling Solid Waste “troubling because 
of the Court’s insistence on interpreting the case and the Clean Water Act as involving land use 
regulation, a function it characterized as ‘traditionally performed by local governments,’ rather 
than as an example of federal environmental leadership in pollution control, protection of 
biodiversity, or wildlife regulation.” (footnote omitted)).  
 123. NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012).  
 124. See id. at 547−58 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (“The individual mandate forces individuals 
into commerce precisely because they elected to refrain from commercial activity. Such a law 
cannot be sustained under a clause authorizing Congress to ‘regulate Commerce.’”); id. at 649−60 
(Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting) (“If this provision ‘regulates’ anything, it is the 
failure to maintain minimum essential coverage . . . . [T]hat failure . . . is not ‘Commerce.’”). 
 125. See, e.g., David A. Strauss, Commerce Clause Revisionism and the Affordable Care Act, 
2012 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 19 (“A central theme of the majority’s opinions in NFIB was that the 
mandate was unconstitutional because it regulated inactivity, rather than activity.”). 
 126. NFIB, 567 U.S. at 552 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).  
 127. Id. at 652 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
 128. Id. at 612 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part and 
dissenting in part) (quoting Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1213 (7th Cir. 1988) (en 
banc)). 
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be recharacterized as an active “decision to self-insure.”129 To be sure, 
the question of how to characterize the regulated behavior represented 
only one of many points of disagreement among the Justices in NFIB. 
But with respect to the particular issue of whether the mandate 
regulated activity or inactivity, the Justices’ disagreement stemmed 
largely from competing characterizations of the behavior that the 
mandate targeted. 
E. Characterizing Injuries 
Modern Article III standing doctrine requires a would-be plaintiff 
to demonstrate the existence of an injury-in-fact that is both fairly 
traceable to a defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct and redressable 
by the courts.130 All three components of the test have generated 
uncertainty: courts frequently disagree as to whether a claimed injury 
is sufficiently concrete, whether the causal link between the injury and 
the claimed unlawful conduct is sufficiently direct, and whether a 
favorable judgment would be sufficiently ameliorative of the injury in 
question. These disagreements stem in part from competing 
conceptions of each component’s underlying requirements: How 
actual, particularized, and imminent must a claimed injury be to satisfy 
the injury-in-fact requirement? How does one measure the causal link 
between the injury and the challenged activity for purposes of the 
fairly-traceable requirement? How substantially must judicial relief 
alleviate the injury for purposes of the redressability requirement? But 
lurking beneath these disputes are important questions of 
characterization as well. Simply put, whether or not a claimed injury 
meets the Article III standard will sometimes depend on what that 
injury is understood to be.131 
Consider, for instance, Professor Gene Nichol’s discussion of the 
standing determinations in Linda R.S. v. Richard D.,132 Warth v. 
Seldin,133 and Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights 
 
 129. Id. at 615; see also id. at 612 (“An individual who opts not to purchase insurance from a 
private insurer can be seen as actively selecting another form of insurance: self-insurance.”). 
 130. E.g., Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (setting out the elements of 
standing).  
 131. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1432, 1464 (1988) (noting that the “central problem” in many standing “cases is not whether 
there is a causal nexus among injury, remedy, and illegality; it is how to characterize the relevant 
injury”). 
 132. Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973).  
 133. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).  
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Organization134—three cases in which the plaintiffs alleged an injury 
based on their difficulties in obtaining access to a service or good.135 In 
Linda R.S., the plaintiffs challenged the discriminatory enforcement of 
a state child support law, citing to the reduced availability of child 
support assistance as their alleged injury-in-fact.136 In Warth, the 
plaintiffs challenged a local government’s exclusionary zoning policy, 
citing to the reduced availability of housing as their injury-in-fact.137 
And in Simon, the plaintiffs challenged the provision of favorable tax 
treatment to hospitals, citing to the reduced availability of medical 
services as their alleged injury-in-fact.138 All three cases, in short, 
involved plaintiffs seeking access to something and claiming that 
unlawful government activity frustrated their ability to obtain it. And 
all three cases foundered on causation/redressability grounds, with the 
Court concluding that the relief being sought—even if issued—would 
not do enough to alleviate the injuries in question.139 
In one sense, these cases turned on the plaintiffs’ failure to 
demonstrate that ceasing the allegedly unlawful behavior would 
guarantee them access to the goods and services they sought: even with 
the requested injunctions in place, the Linda R.S. plaintiffs might still 
fail to obtain child support, the Warth plaintiffs might still fail to obtain 
housing, and the Simon plaintiffs might still lack access to medical 
services. But in another sense, their outcomes rested on contestable 
characterizations of the injuries that prompted these plaintiffs to bring 
suit. Nichol explains: 
  In Linda R.S., the Court refused jurisdiction because even a decree 
requiring nondiscriminatory enforcement would not ensure support. 
But why was obtaining the payment of child support considered the 
relevant injury? The mother in Linda R.S. sought to be treated on an 
equal basis with married mothers. Her injury—denial of equal 
treatment—would undoubtedly have been redressed by an 
affirmative decree requiring enforcement of child support obligations 
 
 134. Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976).  
 135. Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Rethinking Standing, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 68, 79–82 (1984). 
 136. Linda R.S., 410 U.S. at 615–16.  
 137. Warth, 422 U.S. at 495–96.  
 138. Simon, 426 U.S. at 45.  
 139. See id. (“Speculative inferences are necessary to connect [the respondents’] injury to the 
challenged actions of petitioners.”); Warth, 422 U.S. at 506 (“[T]he record is devoid of any 
indication . . . that, were the court to remove the obstructions attributable to respondents, such 
relief would benefit petitioners.”); Linda R.S., 410 U.S. at 618 (“The prospect that prosecution 
will, at least in the future, result in payment of support can, at best, be termed only speculative.”).  
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against unmarried fathers. Similarly, the Warth plaintiffs sought not 
only to obtain housing in Penfield. They also asserted their interest in 
equal participation in a housing market not distorted by 
unconstitutional zoning practices. The denial of a meaningful 
opportunity to persuade others to construct low cost housing in 
Penfield, for example, would have been redressed by a determination 
that the ordinance was unconstitutional. The indigents in Simon had 
no objection to receiving hospital access, but the interest they asserted 
would more appropriately be described as having hospital decisions 
concerning the services offered to indigents accurately reflect an 
earlier incentive structure implicitly approved by the Congress. 
Again, that injury would have been redressed by the claim 
presented.140 
And the puzzle becomes more puzzling when still other cases enter the 
mix. In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,141 the Court 
found no causation or redressability-based bar to an applicant’s 
challenge to a medical school’s affirmative action program.142 As in 
Linda R.S., Warth, and Simon, the plaintiff in Bakke could not 
definitively show that a favorable decision from a court would have 
resulted in his obtaining the service that he sought—namely, an 
education from the UC Davis Medical School. But that fact did not 
matter, the Court held, because the relevant injury suffered by Alan 
Bakke was simply his inability “to compete for all 100 places in the 
class.”143 And that injury, by definition, could obviously be redressed 
by a judicial order requiring that the school allow Bakke to compete 
for all 100 places in the entering class. Bakke might not ultimately gain 
admission to the program, but his injury had been characterized in a 
way that rendered that fact irrelevant. Bakke’s “opportunity-based” 
injury—namely, his inability to compete for class seats on a level 
playing field with others—could thus be certainly remedied, whereas 
the previous plaintiffs’ actuality-based injuries could not.144 The 
 
 140. Nichol, supra note 135, at 80 (footnote omitted); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Standing for 
Animals (With Notes on Animal Rights), 47 UCLA L. REV. 1333, 1356 (2000) (noting that “to 
know whether the redressability requirements are met, it is necessary to know how to characterize 
the relevant injury”). 
 141. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).  
 142. Id. at 280–81 n.14. 
 143. Id.; see Nichol, supra note 135, at 81 (“If . . . the Warth plaintiffs could redress their 
injuries only by showing that they would actually obtain housing, and if the mother in Linda R.S. 
was required to show that she would actually receive support payments, Bakke should have been 
made to prove that he would have gotten into medical school.”). 
 144. See Texas v. Lesage, 528 U.S. 18, 21 (1999) (per curiam) (“Of course, a plaintiff who 
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differences in outcomes therefore stemmed from antecedent 
differences in characterization. 
F. Characterizing Fields 
Characterization problems also attend federal-law preemption 
cases, especially those predicated on theories of implied rather than 
express preemption. A common means of determining whether a 
federal law impliedly preempts a state law is to ask whether the federal 
law “occupies the field” in which the state law regulates.145 Field 
preemption analysis requires courts to identify the regulatory field of 
the allegedly preempted state law and to ask whether that same field 
has already been occupied by the allegedly preemptive federal law. 
Framed in this way, field preemption analysis often turns on how the 
regulatory fields have been characterized. And this is a problem, 
because “[i]n most cases, the relevant ‘field’ can be characterized in 
multiple ways.”146 
In Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources 
Conservation & Development Commission,147 utility companies 
challenged a California moratorium on the construction of nuclear 
power plants, claiming that the law was preempted by the federal 
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (AEA).148 In the challengers’ view, the case 
was straightforward: the AEA occupied the field of nuclear power 
regulation, and the California moratorium—by restricting the 
construction of nuclear power plants—had impermissibly encroached 
upon that field.149 But the Court saw things differently. In its eyes, the 
 
challenges an ongoing race-conscious program and seeks forward-looking relief need not 
affirmatively establish that he would receive the benefit in question if race were not considered. 
The relevant injury in such cases is ‘the inability to compete on an equal footing.’” (quoting Ne. 
Fla. Chapter of the Assoc. Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 666 
(1993)); Ne. Fla. Chapter of the Assoc. Gen. Contractors of Am., 508 U.S. at 666 (“The ‘injury in 
fact’ in an equal protection case of this variety is the denial of equal treatment resulting from the 
imposition of the barrier, not the ultimate inability to obtain the benefit.”). 
 145. See Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 401 (2012) (“Where Congress occupies an 
entire field . . . even complementary state regulation is impermissible.”).  
 146. Ernest A. Young, “The Ordinary Diet of the Law”: The Presumption Against Preemption 
in the Roberts Court, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 253, 336; see also Eang L. Ngov, Under Containment: 
Preempting State Ebola Quarantine Regulations, 88 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 34 (2015) (“[W]hether the 
federal government successfully exerts field preemption depends on how narrowly or broadly the 
field is defined.”). 
 147. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190 
(1983).  
 148. Id. at 194–95.  
 149. Id. at 204. 
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AEA reflected Congress’s desire that “the Federal Government 
should regulate the radiological safety aspects involved in the 
construction and operation of a nuclear plant,”150 whereas the 
California moratorium reflected an attempt to deal with “economic 
problems, not radiation hazards”151 associated with nuclear power. 
Thus, by defining the respective fields of each law narrowly, the Court 
was able to reach the conclusion that the fields did not in fact overlap. 
Related problems emerge from the rule mandating a presumption 
against implied preemption in cases involving “fields of traditional 
state regulation.”152 Here, too, the characterizations of the relevant 
field can matter a great deal, with some characterizations more 
conducive than others to a finding that a federal law touches on a 
traditional regulatory province of the state. Consider, for instance, the 
Second Circuit’s recent decision in Liberty Mutual Insurance v. 
Donegan,153 which presented the question whether the federal ERISA 
statute preempted a Vermont law requiring health insurance 
companies to submit to the state claims data “and other information 
relating to health care.”154 Two judges on the panel found the 
presumption inapplicable and the Vermont law not preempted, 
reasoning that “state health data collection laws do not regulate the 
safe and effective provision of health care services, which is among the 
states’ historic police powers.”155 To the dissenting judge, however, the 
picture looked quite different: The “stated purpose” of the Vermont 
statute was to “help improve health care quality,” and the law certainly 
“‘operate[d] in [the] field’ of health and safety.”156 Health care 
information services may not have qualified as a traditional field of 
state regulation, but “general health care regulation” clearly did so 
qualify.157 And, thus, having characterized the relevant field in such 
divergent fashions, the two sides of Donegan reached different 
conclusions regarding the overall applicability of the presumption 
 
 150. Id. at 205.  
 151. Id. at 213.  
 152. N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins., 514 U.S. 645, 
655 (1995). 
 153. Liberty Mut. Ins. v. Donegan, 746 F.3d 497 (2d Cir. 2014), aff’d sub nom., Gobeille v. 
Liberty Mut. Ins., 136 S. Ct. 936 (2016).  
 154. Id. at 501.  
 155. Id. at 506 n.8; see also id. (noting that “collecting data can hardly be deemed ‘historic’—
most such laws were enacted only within the last ten years”). 
 156. Id. at 513 (Straub, J., dissenting) (second alteration in original) (quoting De Buono v. 
NYSA-ILA Med. & Clinical Servs. Fund, 520 U.S. 806, 814 (1997)). 
 157. Id. at 512. 
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itself. 
These and other preemption cases lend support to one 
commentator’s recent observation that “[t]he doctrine of field 
preemption gives the courts power to affect the federal-state balance 
by choosing the level of generality at which to define the relevant 
field.”158 When it comes to field preemption analysis, in other words, 
characterizing the relevant field “becomes the entire game.”159 
G. And on and on . . . 
Further examples are not difficult to come by. In the First 
Amendment context, for instance, various rules of free speech doctrine 
direct attention to the question of whether a speaker’s message 
involves a “matter of public concern”160—a test that requires judges to 
characterize the matter about which a speaker spoke.161 In a variety of 
doctrinal contexts, courts must ask whether multiple regulatory 
 
 158. Note, Preemption as Purposivism’s Last Refuge, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1056, 1067 (2013) 
[hereinafter Preemption]. 
 159. Id. 
 160. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974) (requiring a showing of 
actual malice to recover presumed or punitive damages against a private figure plaintiff in a 
defamation action involving a matter of public concern); see also Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. 
Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 756 (1985) (confirming that the Gertz framework applies 
only to expression on a “matter of . . . public concern”); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 
568 (1968) (setting forth limited free-speech protections for public employees who have spoken 
on “matters of public concern”).  
 161. In Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011), for instance, the Court had to determine 
whether a protest outside a military funeral dealt with a matter of “public concern.” The Justices’ 
disagreement on this question turned largely on differing characterizations of the “matter” that 
the protesters addressed. Compare, e.g., id. at 454 (contending that the protesters, who charged 
that a deceased soldier’s death represented divine retribution for various sins committed by the 
U.S. government and the public at large, were speaking on “issues” such as “the political and 
moral conduct of the United States and its citizens, the fate of our Nation, homosexuality in the 
military, and scandals involving the Catholic clergy,” all of which qualified as “matters of public 
import”), with id. at 470 (Alito, J., dissenting) (contending that the protesters were “specifically 
attack[ing] Matthew Snyder because (1) he was a Catholic and (2) he was a member of the United 
States military,” and contending that “[w]hile commentary on the Catholic Church or the United 
States military constitutes speech on matters of public concern, speech regarding Matthew 
Snyder’s purely private conduct does not”). See also Clay Calvert, Justice Samuel A. Alito’s 
Lonely War Against Abhorrent, Low-Value Expression: A Malleable First Amendment 
Philosophy Privileging Subjective Notions of Morality and Merit, 40 HOFSTRA L. REV. 115, 173 
(2011) (“Justice Alito also interpreted all of the signs, despite their seeming reference to larger 
political issues, to be personal in reference and personal affronts to Matthew Snyder.”). Everyone 
could agree, in other words, that “the political and moral conduct of the United States” 
constituted a matter of public concern and that Matthew Snyder’s life did not constitute a matter 
of public concern, but the Justices could not agree on which of the two topics counted as the 
“matter” of relevance to the case. 
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“purposes” satisfy an overarching germaneness requirement162—a test 
that requires judges to characterize the relevant purposes whose 
germaneness must be assessed.163 In the dormant Commerce Clause 
context, courts must sometimes ask whether commercial regulations 
serve a “traditional government function”164—a test that requires 
judges to characterize the function whose traditional or nontraditional 
nature is at stake.165 And I suspect that other examples could be found 
 
 162. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Another View of the Quagmire: Unconstitutional Conditions 
and Contract Theory, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 913, 941–46 (2006) (highlighting examples of 
germaneness requirements within constitutional doctrine). 
 163. In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), for instance, the Court 
struck down a conditional land use permit as a violation of the Takings Clause, finding no 
“essential nexus” between the regulatory purpose of the permit condition and the regulatory 
purpose of the permitting regime itself. Id. at 837. To Justice Scalia and four other Justices, an 
essential nexus was lacking: the purpose of the permit condition was to facilitate free public use 
of the ocean, whereas the purpose of the permitting regime was to protect views of the coastline. 
See id. at 838 (“It is quite impossible to understand how a requirement that people already on the 
public beaches be able to walk across the Nollans’ property reduces any obstacles to viewing the 
beach created by the new house.”). But alternative characterizations could have supported a 
different result. Both components of the permitting scheme, for instance, could be said to pursue 
the unitary goal of ensuring adequate public enjoyment of the beach, with the permitting 
requirement facilitating the visual aspects of that enjoyment and the easement requirement 
facilitating the physical aspects of that enjoyment. And if that degree of fit was not good enough, 
one might instead have characterized the two requirements as jointly facilitating “responsible use 
of land,” “the development of a public-friendly coastal community,” or simply “public welfare of 
Californians.” See Nathaniel S. Lawrence, Means, Motives and Takings: The Nexus Test of Nollan 
v. California Coastal Commission, 12 HARV. ENVTL. L.J. 231, 243 (1988) (“There was nothing in 
the majority opinion which argued for adopting its characterization rather than California’s, 
except that it spared the Court from openly admitting its use of heightened scrutiny.”); Jeremy 
Paul, The Hidden Structure of Takings Law, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1393, 1399 (1991) (“If the 
California Coastal Commission were permitted broadly to describe its goal as promoting the best 
use of state beaches and adjacent land, however, the Commission could easily argue that 
restricting the building of private beachfront homes and demanding that members of the public 
be permitted to walk across the beach served the same purpose.”). 
 164. United Haulers Ass’n Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 
345 n.7 (2007); see also Dan T. Coenen, Where United Haulers Might Take Us: The Future of the 
State-Self-Promotion Exception to the Dormant Commerce Clause Rule, 95 IOWA L. REV. 541, 594 
(2010) (highlighting the Court’s reliance on a “traditional-government-function” test as a means 
of determining whether certain types of flow-control ordinances pass constitutional muster). 
 165. In United Haulers, the Justices disagreed as to whether a local ordinance requiring the 
processing of local waste at a government-owned “local transfer facility” served a traditional 
government function, and this disagreement stemmed largely from differing characterizations of 
the function that the facility served. United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 357. To the majority, the 
ordinance dealt with a “typical[] and traditional[] . . . local government function”—namely, the 
problem of “waste disposal.” Id. at 344. But the dissenters saw things differently. As they put it, 
“a ‘traditional’ municipal landfill is for present purposes entirely different from a monopolistic 
landfill supported by the kind of discriminatory legislation . . . in this case,” given that the latter 
sort of landfill “has been deemed unconstitutional until today.” Id. at 369–70 (Alito, J., 
dissenting). In sum, the majority understood the relevant governmental function in United 
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as well. 
The bottom line is this: input-characterization problems 
frequently surface but only sometimes grab the judicial limelight. They 
are influential but often unaddressed. That fact should give us pause. 
If characterization choices really influence the outcomes of 
constitutional cases as frequently as they appear to, then we need to 
think seriously about where these choices come from and how they 
should be made. 
The next two Parts of this Article attempt to do just that. Each 
does so from a different perspective. Part III first considers whether, 
and if so how, constitutional decision rules might be designed so as to 
avoid being influenced or manipulated by characterizations of their 
inputs. As it turns out, this goal can be achieved in at least three 
different ways—the problem, however, is that eliminating the influence 
of characterization choices will likely come at the expense of significant 
tradeoffs that will not always be worth making. That observation sets 
the stage for Part IV, which works through various means by which 
courts might develop principled approaches to rendering the 
characterization choices that a given decision rule demands. Put 
another way, we will first consider the possibility of avoiding 
characterization problems by constructing decision rules that can resist 
the influence of characterization choices, and we will next consider the 
possibility of mitigating characterization problems through the 
development of constraints on the characterization process. 
III.  CHARACTERIZATION-RESISTANT DOCTRINE? 
We have seen that characterization problems arise when the 
outcomes of legal tests depend on how we characterize the inputs that 
go into those tests. This observation suggests that characterization 
problems might be managed, or at least mitigated, at the level of 
decision rule design. Rather than solve the problem of characterization 
by articulating a coherent and principled approach to the making of 
characterization choices, we might instead dissolve the problem by 
formulating decision rules that avoid difficult and consequential 
 
Haulers to be “the disposal of waste,” which in turn qualified as “traditional” under the test the 
Court applied understood the relevant government function to be the operation of a 
“monopolistic landfill,” which did not qualify as “traditional” within the framework of the same 
doctrinal test. See also Coenen, supra note 164, at 594 (noting that application of the “traditional-
government-function” test can “depend on the level of generality at which the court characterizes 
the relevant government activity”). 
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characterization choices altogether. 
This Part considers three potential approaches to avoiding 
characterization problems through the strategic design of legal decision 
rules. First, courts might formulate decision rules that operate on 
objectively identifiable facts requiring little to no characterization of 
their own. Second, courts might formulate decision rules that operate 
on the entirety of a given fact pattern. And finally, courts might 
formulate decision rules that, while requiring characterization choices 
at the outset of the inquiry, are structured in such a way as to render 
characterization choices relatively inconsequential to the overall 
outcome of the case. As we will see, each of these options carries some 
promise, but none provides a panacea. 
A. Targeted Inputs 
The decision rules we considered in Part II share the important 
feature of requiring inputs of an abstract and ethereal nature. Concepts 
such as activities, functions, injuries, interests, rights, and rules do not 
define themselves, and their latent complexities therefore make it 
difficult for courts to characterize particular instances of these concepts 
in uniform and unambiguous terms. When courts must translate the 
factual specifics of a case into the language of a capacious doctrinal 
input, the capaciousness of the input often gives rise to a difficult 
characterization choice. The concept of an “injury” is consistent with a 
complaint about one’s failure to obtain a good, but it is also consistent 
with a complaint about having to compete for that good on an unequal 
basis.166 The concept of an “interest” is consistent with a highly detailed 
and fact-specific regulatory objective, but it is also consistent with big-
picture objectives like “national security,” the “protection of children,” 
and the “wellbeing of the nation.”167 The concept of an “activity” is 
consistent with a description of a single individual’s conduct, but it is 
also consistent with a description of the workings of an entire field of 
business.168 Simply put, the fuzzier the doctrinal input, the wider the 
range of different characterizations it can accommodate. And the 
wider the range of potential characterizations, the harder it becomes to 
choose one among the many possible characterizations that the facts 
might make available. 
An initial characterization-avoidance strategy would attempt to 
 
 166. See supra Part II.E. 
 167. See supra Part II.C. 
 168. See supra Part II.D.  
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reduce the abstractness of the input itself by employing decision rules 
that operate on targeted inputs drawn directly from the facts. Consider, 
for example, the well-known rule of Miranda v. Arizona,169 which 
requires investigators to apprise suspects of certain constitutional 
protections before initiating a custodial interrogation.170 Most 
applications of the Miranda rule require no abstract characterization 
of the facts; one simply cross-references the statement made at the 
beginning of the custodial interrogation against the mandatory 
components of the Miranda warning and determines on the basis of 
that comparison whether the rule has been satisfied. The relevant 
input—the statements made to the defendant—can be lifted directly 
out of the fact pattern of the case; the rule requires no characterization 
of that input into a higher-level set of abstractions. The Miranda rule 
thus turns out to be “easy-to-apply,” not just in the sense that it is 
usually easy to determine whether a given communication satisfies its 
bright-line requirements,171 but also in the sense that it is usually easy 
to identify what that communication is. 
Here is another example. The “actual malice” requirement of New 
York Times v. Sullivan172 imposes special free-speech limits on the 
ability of public figure plaintiffs to obtain defamation judgments.173 It 
is not always easy to determine whether a given defamation plaintiff 
qualifies as a public figure,174 but it is very easy to say who exactly that 
defamation plaintiff is. To identify the relevant input of the public 
figure decision rule, one usually need only consult the caption of the 
case itself—the caption will tell us the identity of the defamation 
plaintiff and thus, by extension, the identity of the relevant doctrinal 
input. No additional characterization of the input is required: the 
person is the person, and courts will therefore rarely, if ever, disagree 
as to how to characterize the entity whose public or nonpublic status 
will help to determine the case’s outcome. Thus, the New York Times 
rule, like the Miranda rule, avoids characterization problems by calling 
 
 169. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 170. Id. at 444. 
 171. See David H. Gans, Strategic Facial Challenges, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1333, 1350 (2005) (noting 
that the Court in Miranda “put in place an overprotective, easy-to-apply rule”).  
 172. N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 173. Id. at 283 (setting forth an “actual malice” rule applicable in cases involving “public 
officials”); see also Harte-Hanks Commc’ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 665 (1989) (noting 
that “public figure libel cases are controlled by the New York Times standard” (citing Curtis 
Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 162 (1967) (plurality opinion))).  
 174. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351 (1974) (outlining criteria according to 
which a plaintiff’s status as a “public” or “private” figure might be judged). 
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for the evaluation of a concretized and specified input—an input that 
emerges directly and uncontroversially from the fact pattern of a given 
case. 
Consider finally the Court’s suggestion in State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance v. Campbell175 that the Due Process Clause 
disfavors the awarding of punitive damages equal to or in excess of ten 
times the amount of compensatory damages.176 Characterization 
problems will not often accompany the determination of whether a 
civil judgment satisfies this criterion.177 Rather, courts can simply 
extract from the fact pattern two readily apparent numerical values 
(the amount of punitive damages and the amount of compensatory 
damages), calculate the ratio between those values, and then determine 
whether that ratio is higher or lower than ten-to-one. 
These decision rules all manage to avoid characterization 
problems by homing in on objectively identifiable facts within the fact 
pattern and rendering those facts at least partially dispositive of the 
constitutional inquiry. Courts need not apply abstract descriptive 
labels to factual information within the record; they instead need only 
select out the particular fact or facts on which the rule’s applicability 
depends. The mine-run Miranda claim does not require us to 
characterize a transaction between suspects and police in terms of 
“interests,” “liberties,” “activities,” and the like. It instead requires us 
to look at the words exchanged prior to an interrogation to determine 
whether those words communicated an adequate warning within the 
meaning of the Miranda test. Similarly, the New York Times rule does 
not require us to characterize a defendant’s allegedly defamatory 
conduct in terms of a relevant “purpose,” “function,” or “subject 
 
 175. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003). 
 176. Id. at 425 (“[I]n practice, few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and 
compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due process.”). 
 177. Characterization problems, to be sure, might still emerge when courts apply other 
components of the State Farm test. The test also instructs courts to consider, for instance, how a 
given damages award compares to “the civil or criminal penalties that could be imposed for 
comparable misconduct.” See BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 583 (1996). And that prong 
of the test appears to be somewhat characterization-dependent, at least insofar as it requires a 
court to characterize the relevant “misconduct” in which a punitive damages defendant engaged. 
Suppose for example, that a defendant kills a plaintiff when driving while drunk and that the 
plaintiff’s estate collects a large punitive damages award. If we were to consider the validity of the 
award by reference to the “comparable sanctions” prong of the State Farm test, we would need to 
consider how the award aligns with other criminal and civil penalties that the state imposes on 
similar misconduct. But to know what penalties to look at, we need to define the relevant 
misconduct in this case—misconduct that could alternatively be characterized as drunk driving, 
reckless driving, vehicular homicide, negligent homicide, homicide, and so forth.  
COENEN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 1/5/2018  3:12 PM 
790  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 67:743 
matter.” Rather, it simply requires us to single out one particular 
variable within the fact pattern—namely, the plaintiff bringing the 
defamation suit—and to evaluate that variable in terms of the criteria 
that distinguish a public from a nonpublic figure. And, finally, while 
other components of the State Farm rule may require us to characterize 
facts in abstract-ified terms, the ratio presumption itself circumvents 
this difficulty; the only input of importance to that particular test is a 
numerical value that the facts can usually furnish in a straightforward 
and unambiguous way. 
These types of decision rules may well succeed at eliminating, or 
at least mitigating, characterization problems within the cases that they 
govern. But as with any effort to increase the predictability and 
objectivity of the law, insisting that a given doctrinal test operate on 
targeted facts rather than abstract characterizations of the facts 
threatens to undermine the nuance, flexibility, and context sensitivity 
of the doctrine writ large.178 We are dealing here with a variation on 
the familiar tradeoff between rules and standards.179 When we single 
out objectively verifiable facts as dispositive determinants of a test’s 
application, we necessarily increase the rule-like—as opposed to 
standard-like—nature of the test and thereby render that test more 
likely to generate outcomes at odds with the substantive values of the 
norm it purports to enforce.180 Within some areas of doctrine, that may 
be a tradeoff worth making: a rule’s over- and underinclusiveness 
problems may be mild enough to justify the gains realized in the way 
of consistency, predictability, and ease of application. But within other 
areas of doctrine, an emphasis on easily definable inputs will result in 
 
 178. This thought is consistent with Duncan Kennedy’s observation that “ruleness” of a 
directive depends in part on its reference to “easily distinguishable factual aspects of a situation.” 
Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1687 
(1976).  
 179. For an overview of the rules/standards debate (and for citations to key contributions to 
the voluminous literature on the subject), see Michael Coenen, Rules Against Rulification, 124 
YALE L.J. 644, 652–53 (2014). 
 180. To be clear, I do not mean to suggest a one-to-one correspondence between “targeted-
input” tests and bright-line rules. Some targeted-input tests will be more bright-line than others, 
with each test’s overall level of nuance and context sensitivity dependent on the nature of the 
evaluative criteria it employs. The New York Times test, for instance, probably qualifies as less 
rule-like than the Miranda test, for the simple reason that determining whether a given person 
qualifies as a public or nonpublic figure will usually be more difficult than determining whether a 
given preinterrogation statement contains the requisite warnings. That said, I do believe that, all 
else equal, targeted-input tests will tend to qualify as more rule-like than their abstract-input 
counterparts.  
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overwhelming problems of fit.181 
Still, if courts are determined enough to avoid characterization 
problems, the targeted-input strategy offers one potential means of 
achieving their goal. One need not think hard to imagine bright-line 
replacements for the characterization-dependent doctrines we 
considered in the previous part. Qualified immunity could be 
automatically available to defendants who prove to the fact finder that 
their violation of the law occurred unknowingly.182 Commerce Clause 
doctrine could validate any and all congressional enactments that 
Congress proclaims to be justified by the commerce power (or, for that 
matter, any and all enactments of Congress, period). Substantive due 
process doctrine could stipulate that courts must always (and only) rule 
in favor of claimants whose name begins with the letter “M.” And these 
rules could certainly be applied in a manner that obviated the need to 
characterize any set of facts in higher-level descriptive terms. The 
trouble is that these rules, and many others like them, will give rise to 
other serious problems that independently militate against their use. It 
is, in other words, always theoretically possible to formulate 
characterization-resistant decision rules that call for targeted 
 
 181. Indeed, even where rules prevail, characterization problems might still creep back into 
the picture. Legal scholars have long noted that bright-line rules tend to lose their brightness over 
time, with the sharp edges of categorical boundaries softened, blurred, and qualified so as to avoid 
otherwise unseemly results. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 178, at 1701; Frederick Schauer, The 
Tyranny of Choice and the Rulification of Standards, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 803, 804 
(2005) (“From the American Legal Realists to the present, legal theorist[s] have devoted some 
attention to the ways in which seemin[g]ly cri[sp] rules may have their edges rounded upon 
application, interpretation, or enforcement.”). Thus, for instance, the Court has crafted a public 
safety exception to the Miranda requirement, permitting officials to conduct warning-less 
interrogations when they are “reasonably prompted by a concern for the public safety.” See New 
York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 656 (1984). Similarly, the Court has extended the protections of 
the New York Times rule to protect not just public figure plaintiffs but also, in a more limited 
fashion, private figure plaintiffs who have spoken on matters of public concern. See, e.g., Gertz v. 
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 348–51 (1974). And, of course, the ratio between punitive and 
compensatory damages must be assessed in connection with myriad other facts before any final 
constitutional judgment can be rendered. See State Farm, 538 U.S. at 418. Rarely is it the case that 
the applicability of a constitutional norm depends entirely on a small number of precisely 
identifiable facts; more often than not, multiple different aspects of a fact pattern will bear on the 
overall inquiry in multiple different ways. Not surprisingly, the more complex and multifaceted 
the inquiry becomes, the greater the risk that characterization problems will start to emerge. 
 182. Notice that this particular example would effectively trade out a difficult characterization 
problem (the problem of characterizing the relevant law that the defendant violated) for a difficult 
problem of fact identification (determining the defendant’s state of mind with respect to the 
illegality of the actions undertaken). For a variety of reasons, this might not be a tradeoff worth 
making. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815–20 (1982) (identifying various downsides 
associated with a “subjective” approach to qualified immunity determinations).  
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assessments of a handful of isolated facts. But it is by no means easy to 
formulate those rules in terms that promote the fair and effective 
implementation of the norm they purport to enforce. 
B. Holistic Inputs 
We first considered the possibility of eliminating characterization 
problems by singling out a fact pattern’s objectively definable features 
as the guiding criteria for a decision rule’s application. But courts might 
also avoid characterization problems by taking the opposite tack—
namely, by designing decision rules that operate on the entirety of a 
given fact pattern rather than any particular facts within it. Call this the 
“holistic input” strategy. The strategy eschews the specificity and 
rigidity of the bright-line rule in favor of the fluidity and open-
endedness of the all-things-considered standard. These sorts of 
decision rules avoid characterization problems by instructing courts to 
evaluate all of the facts before them in their raw and uncharacterized 
form. 
In Rochin v. California,183 the Justices ruled in favor of a criminal 
defendant whose conviction had resulted from an unauthorized entry 
into his home and the forcible “pumping” of morphine capsules out of 
his stomach.184 Notably, the Justices did not attempt to resolve the case 
by asking whether the government had abridged a fundamental right, 
and they thus circumvented the need to define with any precision the 
nature of the relevant liberty interest that the government had 
abridged.185 Instead, cutting straight to the heart of the matter, the 
Court chose to carry out “an exercise of judgment upon the whole 
course of the proceedings” so as to determine whether the state’s 
conduct ran afoul of the basic “standards of justice” that the Due 
Process Clause served to protect.186 And having articulated the inquiry 
in these terms, the Court went on to apply it, concluding that 
the proceedings by which this conviction was obtained do more than 
offend some fastidious squeamishness or private sentimentalism 
about combatting crime too energetically. This is conduct that shocks 
 
 183. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). 
 184. Id. at 165–66. 
 185. See Rosalie Berger Levinson, Time To Bury the Shocks the Conscience Test, 13 CHAP. L. 
REV. 307, 318 n.64 (2010) (“In Rochin, the Court invoked the shocks the conscience test without 
first identifying a fundamental right.”). 
 186. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 169 (emphasis added) (quoting Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 
416–17 (1945)). 
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the conscience. Illegally breaking into the privacy of the petitioner, 
the struggle to open his mouth and remove what was there, the 
forcible extraction of his stomach’s contents—this course of 
proceeding by agents of government to obtain evidence is bound to 
offend even hardened sensibilities.187 
The Court in Rochin thus managed to evade characterization 
choices by fashioning a decision rule—the “shocks-the-conscience” 
test—that took as its input not a particular characterization of the facts, 
but rather all of the facts presented by the case.188 The analysis involved 
a holistic evaluation of the entire course of proceeding, and the test 
thus obviated the need to formulate a single, generalized description of 
any particular right that the government had abridged—and, for that 
matter, any particular government interest that the abridgement might 
have been said to further. The Justices simply surveyed all of the events 
that took place in the days leading up to Rochin’s conviction and 
rendered a judgment as to whether those events—however one might 
choose to characterize them—provoked a conscience-shocking 
reaction. Contestable characterizations of the facts played a minimal 
role in shaping the Court’s analysis of the case. 
The shocks-the-conscience test enjoys only a limited scope of 
application today,189 but other analogous holistic-input tests are not 
difficult to find within constitutional doctrine. For example, Fourth 
Amendment doctrine provides that courts should apply the probable 
cause standard according to an “all-things-considered approach,”190 
 
 187. Id. at 172. 
 188. Accord Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 850 (1998) (noting, in connection with 
an application of the shocks-the-conscience test, that “asserted denial [of due process] is to be 
tested by an appraisal of the totality of facts in a given case” (quoting Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 
455, 462 (1942))). 
 189. Specifically, the Court has confined operation of the test to substantive due process 
claims involving allegedly “abusive” forms of executive action, see Lewis, 523 U.S. at 846 (“[F]or 
half a century now we have spoken of the cognizable level of executive abuse of power as that 
which shocks the conscience.”), while further specifying that the question should be considered 
“antecedent to any question about the need for historical examples of enforcing a liberty interest 
of the sort claimed.” Id. at 847 n.8; see also Robert Chesney, Old Wine or New? The Shocks-the-
Conscience Standard and the Distinction Between Legislative and Executive Action, 50 SYRACUSE 
L. REV. 981, 993 (2000) (noting that “satisfaction of the shocks-the-conscience standard, as 
employed in Lewis, is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the maintenance of a 
substantive due process challenge to executive action”). There remains, however, considerable 
confusion and disagreement within the lower courts as to the precise scope and manner of the 
test’s operation. See Levinson, supra note 185, at 320–34. 
 190. Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 244 (2013) (“In evaluating whether the State has met this 
practical and common-sensical standard, we have consistently looked to the totality of the 
circumstances.”). 
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and that the general reasonableness or unreasonableness of a search or 
seizure should be evaluated by reference to “all the circumstances” 
accompanying its execution.191 Similarly, Sixth Amendment doctrine 
provides that courts must “consider[] all the circumstances” in 
determining whether an attorney’s representation qualifies as 
constitutionally deficient.192 Due process rules governing suggestive 
identification practices employ a totality-of-the-circumstances 
approach, “requir[ing] courts to assess, on a case-by-case basis, 
whether improper police conduct created a ‘substantial likelihood of 
misidentification.’”193 Within these areas of the law, abstract 
conceptual descriptions of the facts need not play a significant role in 
the application of the operative doctrinal test. 
In one sense, this holistic-input strategy poses an inverted version 
of the tradeoff we considered in the previous Section. Whereas an 
emphasis on targeted inputs threatens to render decision rules unduly 
rigid and inflexible in application, an emphasis on holistic inputs might 
render those same rules unduly amorphous and unpredictable, offering 
too little in the way of ex ante guidance as to how a given decision rule 
will apply in various cases.194 To the extent that courts seek some 
measure of certainty and predictability in the operation of a given 
doctrinal test, they might have reason to prefer a more structured, but 
characterization-dependent decision rule over an unstructured, 
holistic-input alternative. Perhaps, for instance, a fundamental rights 
approach to substantive due process analysis is superior to a shocks-
the-conscience approach for the simple reason that the former 
constrains and focuses judicial engagement in a way that the latter does 
not. If so, then characterization problems might be worth enduring for 
the simple sake that the alternative characterization-resistant rule 
leaves too much up in the air.195 
 
 191. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968). 
 192. Strickland v. Washington, 467 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (“In any case presenting an 
ineffectiveness claim, the performance inquiry must be whether counsel’s assistance was 
reasonable considering all the circumstances.”). 
 193. Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U.S. 228, 239 (2012) (quoting Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 
201 (1972)). 
 194. Cf. Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2517 (2014) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(claiming that “th’ol’ totality-of-the-circumstances test” is “not a test at all but merely assertion 
of an intent to perform test-free, ad hoc, case-by-case evaluation”). 
 195. There is another reason to worry about the constraining effect of a holistic-input decision 
rule: the rule itself says nothing about which facts should be included within the “transactional 
frame” to be evaluated. This problem of “framing transactions,” as Professor Daryl Levinson has 
called it, cannot be resolved by simply telling courts to assess the “whole fact pattern” according 
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At the same time, we should be careful not to overstate the 
guidance-based downsides of a holistic-input decision rule. For one 
thing, precedent-based decisionmaking might sometimes clarify and 
concretize the substance of a holistic-input test over time, with courts 
articulating subsidiary principles, presumptions, and rules of thumb 
that help to guide and constrain the test’s application to future cases.196 
More importantly, we must remember the baseline against which these 
holistic-input tests are being compared—namely, an abstract-input 
decision rule that requires the making of a difficult characterization 
choice at the outset of its application. If the characterization process 
itself turns out to be just as freewheeling and undisciplined as a holistic, 
totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry, then characterization-dependent 
decision rules may not prove to be any less amorphous and 
unconstrained in operation than their holistic input counterparts.197 In 
 
to one criterion or another, because there still exists the ancillary challenge of determine what 
facts to include within the “fact pattern” in the first place. Daryl J. Levinson, Framing 
Transactions in Constitutional Law, 111 YALE L.J. 1311, 1314 (2002). As Levinson explains: 
The question of whether government has harmed some individual citizen (or vice 
versa) is meaningful only relative to some transactional frame that determines how 
much of that relationship, which of the multitudinous benefits and harms, should be 
included within the constitutionally relevant transaction. All the rest, left outside the 
transactional frame, will dissolve into the background or baseline from which harm is 
measured. 
Id. Should it have mattered in Rochin, for instance, if the defendant had had several previous run-
ins with the police? Should it have mattered if the police officers had subjected other defendants 
to similarly abusive conduct? Should it have mattered if other members of the police force had 
done the same, or for that matter other police departments around the country? The point, in 
short, is that even the most capacious constitutional decision rules still require courts to make 
threshold choices regarding the definition of the transaction being processed, and that definition 
cannot be guided by the content of the decision rule itself. 
 Notice, however, that the challenge of transactional framing does not vanish when 
holistic-input rules are replaced with abstract-input rules. Indeed, where a rule operates on a 
characterized input rather than an uncharacterized fact pattern, the problem of arbitrariness 
becomes only worse. With an abstract-input rule, a court must first select a transactional frame 
and then recharacterize that frame in terms of the input the rule demands. With a holistic-input 
rule, by contrast, the court need only select the transactional frame before proceeding to evaluate 
it. Thus, while not free from unconstrained definitional choices, holistic-input rules at least carry 
the virtue of requiring one such choice rather than two. 
 196. For an overview of this process, see Coenen, supra note 179, at 653–58. 
 197. For example, while a fundamental rights approach to substantive due process analysis 
may initially seem more structured and predictable than a shocks-the-conscience approach, this 
will only be true to the extent that we can identify a structured and predictable approach to 
characterizing the right whose fundamentality will prove dispositive of the substantive due 
process inquiry. See, e.g., Peter J. Rubin, Square Pegs and Round Holes: Substantive Due Process, 
Procedural Due Process, and the Bill of Rights, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 833, 858 (2003) (noting that 
“without additional guidance about how to determine the appropriate level of generality,” the 
fundamental-rights standard “is as indeterminate as any that can be used by a court”). 
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sum, we might sometimes have certainty- and predictability-based 
reasons for crafting a decision rule in characterization-dependent, 
abstract-input terms, but the benefits to be gained in the way of 
certainty and predictability may turn out to be more apparent than 
real. 
Apart from concerns about guidance and predictability, another 
set of considerations might militate against reliance on a 
characterization-resistant, holistic-input test. These considerations 
become apparent when we recall that judges strive for consistency in 
deciding constitutional cases, taking care to ensure that their present-
day applications of a rule accords with past applications of the rule in 
previous cases.198 Where that is so, characterization-dependent 
decision rules may permit judges to test for and illustrate precedential 
coherence without having to reexamine the factual details of all their 
previous cases. Holistic-input rules, by contrast, make it harder for 
courts to avoid this time- and labor-intensive task. 
To see the point, recall the hypothetical with which this Article 
began—namely, I have been tasked with determining whether the 
subject of a given photograph is a “thing that makes me happy.” That 
task, as we have already seen, implicates difficult characterization 
choices: I must choose one out of many possible characterizations of 
each picture’s “subject” before asking whether that subject is a thing 
that makes me happy. As our discussion here reveals, however, a 
simple reform to the operative decision rule could make all my 
characterization problems go away. Specifically, rather than look for 
pictures whose subjects make me happy, I could instead look for 
pictures that, when viewed in their entirety, simply make me happy. In 
other words, we avoid the characterization problems associated with 
our abstract-input test (“select pictures of things that make you 
happy”) by adopting a holistic-input test instead (“select pictures 
whose overall effect on you is to make you happy”). 
To the extent that each individual application of the decision rule 
 
 198. As a real-world matter, of course, the extent to which prior precedents actually constrain 
Supreme Court decisionmaking is by no means clear. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Has Precedent 
Ever Really Mattered in the Supreme Court?, 24 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 381, 399 (2007) (“Because the 
Supreme Court’s docket is dominated by cases of exceptionally high moral, political, and policy 
consequence, the Supreme Court may actually be the last place to look to find actual traces of 
stare decisis.”). But even assuming that the Court’s own decisions are only weakly bound by prior 
precedent, the Justices might still have reason to care about doctrinal effects on lower court 
decisionmaking—decisionmaking that itself may adhere more strongly to both vertical and 
horizontal stare decisis norms.  
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occurs independently of the others, the first variant of the rule seems 
clearly preferable to the second. Why bother with the difficult 
intermediate step of characterizing the thing depicted by the picture 
when I could instead simply consult my reaction to the picture and 
make my decision based on that? But the choice between the rules 
starts to look more complicated if I am obligated to adhere to a 
consistency norm in selecting pictures from your pile. Simply put, if I 
must evaluate Photograph 10 holistically and do so in a manner that 
coheres with my previous holistic evaluations of Photographs 1 through 
9, then I will likely have to go back and look at all nine of the prior 
photographs, figure out why I decided that those photographs made 
me feel happy or unhappy, and then determine whether those same 
reasons compel me to reach a particular finding in connection with 
Photograph 10. If, by contrast, I am asked to evaluate the subject of 
Photograph 10 and do so consistent with my previous evaluations of 
the subjects of Photographs 1 through 9, I do not need to reexamine 
Photographs 1 through 9 themselves. Rather, I need only (a) 
characterize a subject out of Photograph 10, (b) refresh my recollection 
as the characterized subjects of Photographs 1 through 9, and (c) ask 
how my previous evaluations of those subjects should affect my current 
evaluation of the newly characterized subject before me. Critically, by 
employing a decision rule that operates on characterized inputs rather 
than holistic inputs, I obviate the need to consider all the previous 
features of all the previous photographs. I need only consult the 
simplified list of characterized facts that my previous decisions have 
already generated. 
Returning to the real world, we might associate similar efficiency-
promoting benefits with similarly nonholistic decision rules. For 
example, a perhaps underappreciated virtue of a fundamental rights 
approach to substantive due process analysis is its tendency to generate 
over time a generalized understanding of those rights that do and do 
not qualify as fundamental—an understanding that we can quickly 
consult when asking how to decide a new case in light of past 
precedents.199 Were we instead applying a shocks-the-conscience test, 
the only way to ensure fidelity to our past decisions would be to delve 
back into the factual details of each prior case and to judge whether 
those details, when cross-referenced against each case’s respective 
holding, militated against or in favor of a conscience-shocking finding 
 
 199. But see Tribe, supra note 52, at 1936 (disparaging “the ‘Trivial Pursuit’ version of the due 
process ‘name that liberty’ game arguably validated by Glucksberg”). 
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in the case before us. In a world of infinite cognitive resources, this 
might be the ideal approach; but where resources are limited, the 
characterization-based shortcut might ultimately prove to be the wiser 
and more manageable means of achieving precedential consistency. 
To be sure, this argument assumes that precedential concerns 
should indeed matter when courts decide cases according to a totality-
of-the circumstances analysis. It also assumes that the characterization 
process itself can be carried out without reference to the facts of prior 
cases. Both of these assumptions may turn out to be false, or at least 
overstated. Some holistic-input rules might best be applied in a manner 
that de-emphasizes consistency and coherence and that instead treats 
each case as its own independent problem to be solved by reference to 
its own distinctive facts.200 And some characterization-dependent rules 
might require courts to consider the facts of previous cases when 
determining how to characterize the input at issue in the present-day 
case.201 If either proposition is true, then the efficiency-based case for 
characterization-dependent doctrine becomes much tougher to make. 
The less that precedential considerations should guide a court’s 
application of an open-ended test, the lower the number of outside 
facts a holistic-input rule will require a court to consider. And the more 
that the characterization process requires attention to prior cases’ facts, 
the higher the number of outside facts an abstract-input rule will 
require courts to consider. Either way, the abstract-input rule would 
lose its comparative efficiency-related benefits over its holistic input 
counterpart. 
C. Neutralized Inputs 
A final approach to decision rule design would attack 
characterization problems in a different way. Rather than select for 
inputs that do not require characterization choices in the first place, 
this strategy would acquiesce to the presence of characterization 
choices while attempting to minimize their consequences. Call this the 
“neutralized-inputs” approach. It attempts to formulate decision rules 
in such a way as to confer on characterization choices a set of influences 
that are offsetting rather than unidirectional, effectively muting a 
choice’s overall effects on the outcome of a particular case. 
Means/ends analysis provides an illustrative example. The 
 
 200. See Coenen, supra note 32, at 711–13 (considering this possibility). 
 201. For a discussion considering a precedent-based approach to the characterization process, 
see infra Part IV.C. 
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standard means/ends test requires that a law be sufficiently related to 
a sufficiently important government interest in order to survive 
constitutional attack. We earlier saw how characterization choices 
might influence the determination of whether a given government 
interest qualifies as sufficiently important to pass constitutional 
muster. All else equal, interests characterized at a high level of 
generality (for instance, “an interest in protecting children”) will more 
easily qualify as compelling than interests defined at a lower level of 
generality (for example, “an interest in reducing the extent of a child’s 
inadvertent exposure to profane language on network television”). But 
what we have not yet considered is the possibility that these particular 
outcome-influencing dynamics will be counterbalanced by a separate 
set of dynamics that run in the other direction. And here, some level of 
self-correction may be at work. More specifically, any gains to be had 
from a high-generality characterization at the compelling interest stage 
of the inquiry may yield corresponding losses at the narrow tailoring 
stage. Thus, as Professor Craig Green has suggested, “generality affects 
each of these components in opposite ways.”202 
Consider, once again, the question presented in Holder v. 
Humanitarian Law Project.203 There, recall, the Court applied 
heightened scrutiny in rejecting an as-applied First Amendment 
challenge to the federal “material support” statute, brought by 
plaintiffs “seek[ing] to facilitate only the lawful, nonviolent purposes” 
of foreign groups designated to be terrorist organizations.204 As we 
have seen, one can characterize the relevant government interest in 
Humanitarian Law Project in a number of different ways.205 Running 
from most to least specific, the interest might be characterized as that 
of (1) “cutting off support for the lawful, nonviolent activities of 
foreign organizations designated as terrorist groups,” (2) 
“undermining foreign organizations designated to be terrorist groups,” 
 
 202. Green, supra note 17, at 454. 
 203. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 7–8 (2010).  
 204. Id. at 8. It bears noting that the Court in Humanitarian Law Project never specified the 
level of scrutiny that it was applying. See Eugene Volokh, Speech That Aids Foreign Terrorist 
Organizations, and Strict Scrutiny, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 21, 2010, 5:43 PM), 
http://volokh.com/2010/06/21/speech-that-aids-foreign-terrorist-organizations-and-strict-scrutiny 
[https://perma.cc/JG9M-P8ZE]. What matters for our purposes here, however, is simply that the 
Court applied some variation on the means/ends test, inquiring into both the strength of the 
government’s interest and the extent to which the law’s restrictions on speech were necessary to 
serve that interest. See id. (suggesting that the Court in Humanitarian Law Project did apply strict 
scrutiny, while noting the Court’s failure to define the test it was applying). 
 205. See supra Part II.C. 
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(3) “undermining foreign terrorist groups,” (4) “combating terrorism,” 
or (5) “promoting national security,” with a bunch of intermediate 
options in between. And as the generality level of the government 
interest increases, so too should the ease of demonstrating that 
interest’s overall importance.206 All else equal, the government will 
have less difficulty in highlighting the vital importance of “promoting 
national security” than the vital importance of “cutting off support for 
the lawful, nonviolent activities of foreign organizations designated to 
be terrorist groups.” In that sense, the operative decision rule looks to 
be at least somewhat sensitive to characterization choices, with some 
characterizations of the facts more likely than others to yield a 
government-friendly result.207 
But things turn out not to be so simple, as something interesting 
happens when we proceed to ask whether the law is sufficiently closely 
related to the government interest we have identified. Here, we 
encounter something akin to the opposite relationship between 
generality levels and justificatory ease: the more generally we have 
characterized the government interest, the more difficult it becomes to 
demonstrate the requisite means/ends fit. We would have little trouble 
demonstrating that the material support statute is necessary to further 
the government’s interest in “cutting off support for the lawful, 
 
 206. See Green, supra note 17, at 454 (“As an interest is defined more generally, it becomes 
more important . . . .”). 
 207. Militating in the other direction is Professor Dov Fox’s recent suggestion that broadly 
defined government interests might actually end up facilitating, rather than frustrating, courts’ 
efforts to demonstrate the requisite means/ends fit. Fox suggests that broadly defined government 
interests might give rise to the phenomenon of “interest creep,” whereby courts permit “an 
“uncritical expansion of a government reason that courts have endowed with justificatory force 
to swallow discrete sources of concern over time.” See Fox, supra note 6, at 284–85. Put 
differently, broadly defined government interests might end up lending support to the 
government at both the “weightiness” and “relatedness” stages of the means/ends inquiry, and 
they would do so for the simple reason that broadly defined interests bring into play a wider range 
of prior progovernment decisions that a reviewing court might invoke. Id. As Fox explains: 
Once a court of last resort designates an imprecise interest like national security or 
child protection as the canonical kind capable of overriding constitutional guarantees, 
agencies and legislatures predictably glom onto it the disparate kinds of concerns that 
arise in related controversies. Lower court judges—who do not want their decisions 
reversed any more than lawmakers want their policies overturned—approve these 
varied concerns in the underspecified terms of that controlling authority without 
explaining why or how that interest applies in that new context. Its contours thereby 
swell over time to encompass this wide swath of rubberstamped concerns. 
Id. at 277. The phenomenon of interest creep might thus provide some reason to be skeptical of 
the extent to which the means/ends test can operate successfully as a neutralized-input decision 
rule. Interest creep may instead result in broadly characterized interests exerting a uniform and 
unidirectional tilt of the means/ends inquiry in the government’s favor.  
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nonviolent activities of foreign organizations designated as terrorist 
groups”—that objective, after all, is precisely what the material support 
statute purports to do. But would the law count as necessary to further 
the more generally defined interest in “promoting national security” or 
“combating terrorism”? Maybe, but maybe not. The problem is that 
the government can “protect national security” or “combat terrorism” 
in many more ways than it can “cut off support for the lawful, 
nonviolent activities of foreign organizations designated to be terrorist 
groups.” And the wider the range of potential means of achieving an 
interest, the more likely it becomes that a less restrictive or less 
discriminatory means will emerge from the heap—thus demonstrating 
that the chosen means was fatally over- or underinclusive with respect 
to the interest in question.208 In other words, broadening our 
characterization of the government interest may make things easier for 
the government (and more difficult for the challengers) when 
evaluating the strength of the interest, but it will then make things more 
difficult for the government (and easier for the challengers) when 
evaluating the degree of fit between the interest and the law. 
One might imagine similar mechanisms at work in Article III 
standing doctrine. Recall our earlier exploration of the connection 
between characterization choices and the redressability prong of the 
standing test.209 There, I suggested that courts can stack the deck in 
favor of a pro-redressability finding by characterizing injuries in 
opportunity-based, as opposed to actuality-based, terms. But when we 
recall the additional requirement that an injury must also qualify as 
“concrete” and “particularized” (as opposed to “abstract” and 
“generalized”), the picture becomes more complicated. A court that 
defines an injury in opportunity-based terms might have an easier time 
demonstrating redressability than will a court that defines the injury in 
actuality-based terms, but it might then have a correspondingly more 
difficult time demonstrating concreteness. And conversely, a court that 
defines an injury in actuality-based terms may have an easier time 
demonstrating concreteness than will a court that defines the injury in 
opportunity-based terms, but it will then have a correspondingly more 
difficult time demonstrating redressability. The first and third prongs 
 
 208. See, e.g., Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 686 (7th Cir. 2013) (“Stating the governmental 
interests at such a high level of generality makes it impossible to show that the mandate is the 
least restrictive means of furthering them.”); Robert C. Farrell, Legislative Purpose and Equal 
Protection’s Rationality Review, 37 VILL. L. REV. 1, 17 (1992) (“If a court chooses to define 
legislative purpose broadly, the statute will likely be underinclusive.”). 
 209. See supra Part I.C. 
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of the Article III test are each sensitive to characterization choices, but 
they might be sensitive to those choices in offsetting ways. Thus, while 
individual components of the Article III standing test may be 
manipulated by strategic characterizations of the relevant injury, the 
components taken together might not be. 
Self-correcting mechanisms thus strike me as at least a 
theoretically possible means of lowering the overall stakes of a given 
characterization problem.210 Even if turns out that courts must make 
fundamentally arbitrary choices in describing government interests, 
injuries, and other doctrinal inputs, perhaps the choices will not much 
matter in dictating a decision rule’s application to the input in question. 
Still, there are reasons to temper our enthusiasm as to how much a self-
correction strategy can achieve. Most importantly, even if multiple 
components of a doctrinal test predictably respond to an input’s 
characterization in different ways, it does not follow that the magnitude 
of the responses will be precisely, or even roughly, equivalent. When it 
comes to means/ends analysis, for instance, generality levels might 
matter more at the first step of the inquiry than at the second, with the 
chosen characterization of the government interest exerting a major 
influence on whether that interest counts as compelling, important, 
legitimate, and only a minor countervailing influence on whether there 
is a sufficiently close fit between the interest itself and the law under 
review. Similarly, perhaps the characterization of a plaintiff’s injury 
will affect courts’ perception of concreteness more substantially than 
their perceptions of redressability (or vice versa). In these and other 
ways, a characterization choice’s outcome-influencing effects at one 
stage of the inquiry might simply overwhelm its purportedly 
countervailing effects at another stage of the inquiry. 
There is another problem too: the equilibrating potential of a 
multipart rule will often work in only one direction. For reasons we 
have already seen, the strict scrutiny test might help to neutralize the 
 
 210. A further possibility, suggested to me by Jon Romberg, is that a neutralized-input rule 
might work in connection with a further rule that allocates to a burden-bearing party the power 
to adopt the relevant characterization choice. Cf. infra note 247 (discussing in further detail the 
possibility of involving litigants in the making of characterization choices). Thus, for example, a 
court might simply instruct the party tasked with, say, demonstrating that a law withstands strict 
scrutiny, to identify the characterization that the party wishes the court to use. And the court 
would then proceed to work with that characterization choice without asking any further 
questions about it. The equilibrating potential of the rule makes this option feasible. The burden-
bearing party cannot egregiously manipulate outcomes via its characterization choice because any 
outcome-promoting gains conferred by that choice at one part of the inquiry will be offset by 
losses incurred at another part of the inquiry. 
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effects of characterization choices when it comes to demonstrating the 
constitutionality of a suspect law. A broad characterization of the 
government interest might support the desired conclusion at the 
“compelling interest” stage of the inquiry while undercutting that 
conclusion at the “narrow tailoring” stage of the inquiry. But if the aim 
is to show that the law fails strict scrutiny, then manipulation via 
characterization remains easy to accomplish, as a court could 
characterize the relevant interest in narrow and context-specific terms 
so as to demonstrate that it does not satisfy the “importance” prong of 
the test and thus by extension the test as a whole. So too with standing 
doctrine. It may be difficult, as we have seen, for a court to deploy a 
single characterization of the relevant injury for purposes of 
demonstrating the existence of Article III standing, but it will remain 
easy to manipulate the test in the other direction. If, for instance, the 
court wants to hear a case, its efforts to accommodate the redressability 
prong of the inquiry will frustrate its efforts to accommodate the 
concreteness prong, and vice versa. But if a court wishes to avoid 
hearing the case, it can easily characterize the relevant injury in terms 
that either the abstractness prong or the redressability prong will find 
wanting. More generally, the point is simply that self-correcting 
mechanisms work only when courts need to demonstrate that all 
prongs of a test have been satisfied. But those mechanisms have no 
value when the aim is simply to show that one prong of the test has not 
been satisfied.211 
At the same time, some amount of self-correction may be 
preferable to no amount of self-correction, in which case courts should 
continue exploring opportunities to utilize the neutralized-inputs 
strategy across different areas of doctrine. At one level, this may mean 
expanding the already significant presence of means/ends analysis 
within constitutional law. At another level, it might mean devising new 
decision rules that respond to a single characterization choice in 
similarly countervailing ways. To be sure, the presence of neutralized 
inputs does not in and of itself provide reason to favor one decision 
rule over another; other factors can and should enter into the calculus. 
But all else equal, decision rules that respond to characterization 
choices in a unidirectional manner might ultimately qualify as less 




 211. I am grateful to John Rappaport for a helpful conversation on this point. 
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If nothing else, the previous Part suggests that characterization 
problems are not likely to go away anytime soon. We may sometimes 
be able to avoid these problems by devising targeted-input and holistic-
input tests, and we may sometimes be able to neutralize the effects of 
our characterization choices by devising decision rules that reduce the 
decisional influence of a given characterization choice. But these 
modifications will not always be available, and courts will therefore 
often find themselves tasked with applying a decision rule whose 
outcome depends on a contestable characterization of the input. 
Assuming, then, that outcome-influencing characterization choices will 
remain a part of the constitutional decisionmaking process, the crucial 
question becomes how to confront them. 
IV.  CONSTRAINING CHARACTERIZATION CHOICES 
This Part highlights three types of approaches to the 
characterization of constitutional inputs. It first considers the 
possibility of providing ex ante guidance regarding the proper level of 
generality at which the relevant input should be characterized. It next 
focuses on the possibility of results-based characterization, which 
proceeds by identifying the factual characterization that maximizes the 
likelihood of generating the appropriate-seeming doctrinal result. And 
this Part concludes by considering the possibility of precedent-driven 
characterization, which treats old characterizations from previous 
cases as a guide to rendering new characterizations of present-day 
facts. As we will see, each of these strategies carries some promise, but 
none offers a foolproof solution to the challenges that the process 
poses. 
A. Controlling Generality Levels 
An initial approach to characterization choices might focus on 
levels of generality. Facts can often be characterized in more or less 
general terms, and an input’s generality level can significantly influence 
doctrinal outcomes. We saw this point on display in Part II. A right is 
more likely to qualify as fundamental when we characterize that right 
as a lofty abstraction rather than a particularized grievance;212 a rule is 
more likely to qualify as clearly established when we characterize it as 
a generally applicable prohibition on conduct rather than a particular 
 
 212. See supra Part II.A. 
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application of that prohibition to the facts of a given case;213 and a 
government interest is more likely to qualify as compelling when we 
characterize that interest in terms of a big-picture regulatory objective 
rather than a targeted and contingent goal.214 All of this being so, courts 
might attempt to constrain characterization choices through ex ante 
specifications of desired generality levels. In other words, a 
characterization-dependent decision rule might carry its own set of 
instructions regarding the particular generality level at which its input 
should be defined. And with the optimal generality level so prescribed, 
subsequent characterization choices could proceed in a controlled, 
predictable, and nonarbitrary fashion. 
The most familiar example of this strategy comes from a famous 
footnote in Justice Scalia’s Michael H. v. Gerald D. opinion.215 There, 
Justice Scalia called for an approach to substantive due process cases 
that would characterize an asserted right at “the most specific level at 
which a relevant tradition protecting, or denying protection to, the 
asserted right can be identified.”216 Justice Scalia’s prescription—as 
Professors Michael C. Dorf and Laurence H. Tribe have noted—had 
an “algorithmic” feel: characterize the asserted right at some minimal 
level of generality, look for a decisive tradition involving the right so 
characterized, and, if no such tradition exists, ratchet up the generality 
level and try again.217 The prescription thus sought to constrain 
characterization choices by prospectively dictating that a given factual 
characterization be pitched at the minimum level of generality that 
“tradition” permits.218 
The Michael H. approach never won approval from a majority of 
the Court, but other, less overt attempts at “generality control” are 
arguably present within the case law. In Glucksberg, for instance, a 
majority of Justices admonished courts to formulate a “careful 
description” of the asserted liberty interest in substantive due process 
cases, articulating a requirement that, in practice, appears to favor the 
characterization of rights in low-generality terms.219 In the qualified 
 
 213. See supra Part II.B. 
 214. See supra Part II.C. 
 215. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989) (plurality opinion). This footnote 
was joined only by Chief Justice Rehnquist. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Tribe & Dorf, supra note 6, at 1085. 
 218. Id. at 1086. 
 219. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997); see Kenji Yoshino, A New Birth of 
Freedom?: Obergefell v. Hodges, 129 HARV. L. REV. 147, 157 (2015) (claiming that Glucksberg’s 
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immunity context, the Court has “repeatedly told” its subordinates 
“not to define clearly established law at a high level of generality,”220 
and it has elsewhere noted that “the right allegedly violated must be 
defined at the appropriate level of specificity before a court can 
determine if it was clearly established.”221 Strands of the Court’s 
nonretroactivity jurisprudence warn against defining the relevant rule 
at an “unduly elevated level of generality.”222 The Court has at least 
hinted at a preference for low-generality characterizations in the 
Commerce Clause context, obliquely observing that “depending on the 
level of generality, any activity can be looked upon as commercial.”223 
And two terms ago, Justice Scalia himself voiced a preference for low-
generality characterizations in connection with the strict scrutiny test, 
reasoning that “[t]he State must . . . identify its objective with precision 
before one can tell whether that interest is compelling and whether the 
speech restriction narrowly targets it.”224 In various ways, these 
statements reflect judicial attempts to cabin characterization choices 
through the imposition of generality-based limits. Some such attempts, 
like the Michael H. approach, prescribe these limits in detailed terms; 
other such attempts are less ambitious, simply warning against the 
dangers of taking generality levels too far in one direction. But the 
underlying intuition is largely the same: courts might attempt to guide 
the characterization process by stipulating the appropriate level of 
generality at which the characterized input should be cast. 
Prescribing desired generality levels may impose some small 
measure of discipline on the characterization process. But, for a variety 
of reasons, the strategy is limited in terms of what it can achieve. The 
central difficulty is one of measurement: it is often hard to describe 
with any precision the threshold point at which the desired level of 
generality lies. We may all agree that a court has gone too far up the 
 
“[c]areful description” requirement served as “a transparent Trojan horse” for the command to 
employ a “specific description”). 
 220. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011). 
 221. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 615 (1999).  
 222. Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 315 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment); see also 
Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333, 344 (1993) (“[T]he level of generality at which respondent 
invokes this line of cases is far too great to provide any meaningful guidance for purposes of our 
Teague inquiry.”); Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 236 (1990) (“The [Teague] test would be 
meaningless if applied at this level of generality.”). 
 223. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 565 (1995); see also Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 
49 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (noting that “[t]he Court’s definition of economic activity is 
breathtaking”). 
 224. Williams-Yulee v. Fl. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1678 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
COENEN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 1/5/2018  3:12 PM 
2018] CHARACTERIZING CONSTITUTIONAL INPUTS 807 
generality spectrum when it characterizes a claimant’s liberty interest 
as amounting to an interest in “enjoying freedom,” and we all may also 
agree that a court has gone too far down the generality spectrum when 
it characterizes that same liberty interest as amounting to an interest in 
“not doing precisely what the government is requiring the claimant to 
do in this particular case.” But innumerable other characterization 
choices lie between these two extremes, and it is hard to know or even 
imagine how one would further specify where within this vast territory 
the desired generality-level can be found.225 We have yet to develop a 
reliable generality-ometer, capable of assigning to each factual 
characterization, say, a generality score between 0 and 100 to be cross-
referenced against whatever specified generality value the doctrine 
demands. And that in turn leaves us with vague and largely useless 
instructions regarding the proper levels of generality to be used. It is, 
indeed, telling that the Court’s very few attempts to specify desired 
generality levels—e.g., adopt a “careful description” of the liberty 
interest, define the relevant rule at an “appropriate level of specificity,” 
 
 225. One possibility, raised by Professor David Faigman, might involve a comparative 
assessment of generality levels as between multiple, different inputs that factor into a single 
doctrinal test. Professor Faigman suggests, for instance, that when courts engage in a “balancing” 
of government interests against liberty interests, they should take care to “use the same level of 
generality on both sides of the balance.” Faigman, supra note 6, at 780. This is an intriguing idea, 
but it too has its limits. For one thing, even if the comparative approach obviates the need to 
describe generality levels in an absolute sense, it still leaves open the difficult question of how to 
determine whether the generality level of one doctrinal variable is or is not the same as the 
generality level of another. More importantly, the comparative approach, even if fully successful, 
would enjoy a limited range of application, constraining characterization choices only in 
connection with rules that balance one characterized input against another.  
A further possibility is suggested by Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, who draws a sharp 
distinction between constitutional provisions that concern the validity of congressional action and 
those that concern the validity of executive action. See Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, The Subjects 
of the Constitution, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1209, 1224–26 (2010). Specifically, Rosenkranz suggests that 
when applying clauses as to whom “Congress” is the relevant subject, courts should accord no 
doctrinal significance to any “facts of enforcement” that accompany a particular case. See id. at 
1275–76 (noting that “a claim that Congress violated the Constitution by making a law, when it 
made the law, is inherently a ‘facial challenge’” and that “specific facts of enforcement cannot 
matter here, for the simple reason that the constitutional violation is complete before those facts 
arise” (emphasis omitted)). With executive action, however, enforcement-specific facts can and 
should figure into the merits-based inquiry. See id. at 1245 (noting that, when the constitutional 
inquiry concerns executive action, “the doctrinal test will probably be fact-intensive”). 
Rosenkranz’s approach would likely simplify characterization problems to some extent; especially 
with respect to Congress-centered norms, his approach would manage to eliminate a number of 
potential characterization choices by prescribing high-generality characterizations of the relevant 
conduct under review. But difficulties would still remain, as courts would still need to confront 
the challenge of deciding which particular legislation-specific facts or enforcement-specific facts 
to include when characterizing the particular input that a decision rule demands.  
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and so forth—offer about as much in the way of useful guidance as the 
encouraging-but-ultimately-banal exhortation to “make it work.”226 
Absent a reliable means of describing and measuring generality levels, 
generality-based limits on the characterization process will be difficult 
to follow and easy to ignore. 
We might try to circumvent the measurement problem by 
outlining an algorithmic, step-by-step approach to identifying the 
proper generality level, but even a framework of this sort is likely to 
leave major indeterminacy problems in its wake. Consider again 
Justice Scalia’s suggestion that the right being evaluated in a 
substantive due process case should be characterized at the most 
specific level for which a relevant historical tradition exists. The 
instruction sounds alluringly straightforward, but it leaves unanswered 
several vital questions: How do we choose the initial characterization 
with which to begin our investigation?227 How (and, dare we ask, at 
what level of generality) does one identify the relevant tradition to 
consult?228 How does one know whether the relevant tradition speaks 
to or does not speak to the fundamental status of the characterized 
right? If the relevant tradition is indeterminate with respect to a low-
generality characterization of a liberty interest, how far up the 
generality spectrum should we go before we try again? Generality 
levels, in short, are difficult to measure, difficult to describe, and 
difficult even to compare, and we do not gain much of anything by 
attempting to guide the characterization inquiry by the presence or 
absence of particular traditions of relevance to a characterized right. 
What is more, even if we could figure out a way to specify optimal 
generality levels, we would still need to devise a way of constraining 
characterization choices within the permitted generality range. The 
problem here is that a single set of facts can be plausibly characterized 
in multiple ways—even at the exact same level of generality. As Dorf 
and Tribe have put the point, there is no “single dimension of 
 
 226. See Project Runway (Bravo/Lifetime 2004–present). 
 227. One might think that this question can be easily answered vis-à-vis an instruction to start 
with the lowest possible generality level, but this specification turns out not to help very much. If 
the minimum-generality characterization of a right is simply a restatement of all the facts leading 
up to a particular rights-based claim, then no “relevant tradition” will ever speak to the existence 
of the right. And that in turn means that we need to increase the generality of our characterization 
by abstracting away some of the facts with which we began. But then the (very difficult) question 
becomes: which facts do we abstract away? See text accompanying infra notes 229–30.  
 228. See Tribe & Dorf, supra note 6, at 1087.  
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specificity” along which a characterization choice proceeds.229 The 
universe of available characterizations does not resemble a single line 
proceeding from most specific to most general; rather, that universe is 
better captured by an outwardly branching tree, with more and more 
potential characterizations becoming available the higher up the 
generality spectrum we go. Dorf and Tribe illustrate this idea nicely 
with respect to Michael H. As they explain: 
According to Justice Scalia, if “there were no societal tradition, either 
way, regarding the rights of the natural father of a child adulterously 
conceived, [the Court] would have to consult, and (if possible) reason 
from, the traditions regarding natural fathers in general.” As Justice 
Scalia states the problem, after traditions regarding the rights of the 
natural father of a child adulterously conceived, traditions regarding 
natural fathers in general are the next most specific. But why must 
this be so? Why not abstract out the father’s sex, and consult general 
traditions regarding parental rights of children adulterously 
conceived, and reason from these? Perhaps we can learn something 
from the way the law treats natural mothers of adulterously conceived 
children. Or alternatively, why not abstract Gerald D. out of the case 
and consult traditions regarding unmarried fathers’ rights in 
circumstances where the mother was not married to some other man 
at the time of conception? In other words, when we find no relevant 
tradition concerning asserted right X under conditions 1 and 2, do we 
consult traditions concerning right X under condition 1 in general, or 
do we consult traditions concerning right X under condition 2 in 
general?230 
In sum, we cannot count on ex ante instructions regarding 
generality levels to provide anything more than very rough-cut limits 
 
 229. Id. at 1090. 
 230. Id. at 1090–91 (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted) (citing Michael H. v. Gerald 
D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989)). One way around this difficulty would be to stipulate that the 
operative input of a decision rule should be described at the lowest level of generality possible. 
But an instruction to maximize specificity (and hence minimize abstraction) in the 
characterization of an input would, in practice, be no different from an instruction to consider “all 
the relevant facts” (or the “totality of the circumstances”) when disposing of a constitutional 
claim. Admonishing courts to “characterize inputs at the maximum possible level of specificity” 
is functionally the same as admonishing courts not to characterize inputs in the first place and 
instead to apply the relevant decision rule to the entirety of a case’s fact pattern. That holistic-
input approach to constitutional decisionmaking, as we have seen, may well be appropriate under 
some circumstances. See supra Part III.B. But useful or not, this is not an approach that relies on 
characterization at all. Saying then that characterization problems can be solved by instructing 
courts to characterize inputs at the maximum possible level of specificity is simply another way of 
saying that characterization problems can be avoided by instructing courts to evaluate the totality 
of a case’s fact pattern. 
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on the characterization choices that a given rule demands. Ex ante 
instructions might suffice to discourage characterization choices at the 
extreme ends of the generality spectrum, but they rapidly lose their 
utility as we move away from those extremes. Generality levels, in 
short, are difficult to describe, difficult to measure, and difficult to 
compare. What is more, even if clear-cut instructions about generality 
levels could be rendered, those instructions would leave unanswered 
the critical question of how to choose among the variety of plausible 
characterizations that might exist within the desired generality range. 
If we are to devise a meaningful approach to the making of 
characterization choices, that approach must involve something more 
than references to generality levels alone. 
B. Results-Based Characterization 
A second approach to the input-characterization process would 
appeal directly to desired results. Call this the “results-based” 
characterization strategy: it proceeds by characterizing inputs in a 
manner that helps to generate the appropriate-seeming outcome under 
a given doctrinal test. Courts would, in effect, collapse the 
characterization of a doctrinal input into the application of the 
operative decision rule, citing to a given input’s tendency to satisfy or 
not satisfy the rule’s underlying criterion as a reason for or against 
characterizing the facts in a particular way. 
The Court has sometimes been quite explicit about its willingness 
to render characterization choices in this manner. Recall, for instance, 
the Court’s changed approach to the question whether state 
antisodomy laws violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive due 
process protections. In Bowers v. Hardwick, the Court answered in the 
negative, finding that the Fourteenth Amendment conferred no 
“fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy.”231 But 
the Court subsequently reversed course, finding that the majority in 
Bowers had erred by, among other things, characterizing the relevant 
right in unduly narrow terms. Specifically, in holding that antisodomy 
laws implicated nothing more than a right to engage in a particular 
form of sexual activity, the Court in Bowers had “fail[ed] to appreciate 
the extent of the liberty at stake.”232 More specifically: 
To say that the issue in Bowers was simply the right to engage in 
 
 231. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986).  
 232. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003). 
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certain sexual conduct demeans the claim the individual put forward, 
just as it would demean a married couple were it to be said marriage 
is simply about the right to have sexual intercourse. The laws involved 
in Bowers and here are, to be sure, statutes that purport to do no more 
than prohibit a particular sexual act. Their penalties and purposes, 
though, have more far-reaching consequences, touching upon the 
most private human conduct, sexual behavior, and in the most private 
of places, the home. The statutes do seek to control a personal 
relationship that, whether or not entitled to formal recognition in the 
law, is within the liberty of persons to choose without being punished 
as criminals.233 
This might seem like circular logic, amounting to little more than 
a claim that the Bowers characterization was unduly narrow because 
the Bowers characterization was unduly narrow. But a better take on 
the argument would see it as rooted in the premise that, however one 
characterized the liberty interest implicated by antisodomy laws, it was 
not one that the government should have been able to impinge. In 
other words, the Court in Bowers “misapprehended the claim of liberty 
there presented to it”234 precisely because it had adopted a 
characterization that supported (rather than undermined) the 
conclusion that the liberty interest was nonfundamental. The Court in 
Lawrence, by contrast, had implicitly concluded that antisodomy laws 
infringed a fundamental right, and it thus chose to characterize the 
liberty interest in a manner that conduced to that conclusion. Thus, 
rather than proceed from a characterization of the right to an 
evaluation of its fundamentality, this argument worked the other way, 
with the Court in Lawrence deriving a more capacious characterization 
of the liberty interest from what it already perceived to be the 
necessary constitutional result.235 
Lest one regard this technique as unique to the Lawrence majority, 
other cases from other doctrinal areas reveal similar analytical moves. 
Consider, for instance, this description of qualified immunity analysis, 
authored by Justice Scalia: 
 
 233. Id. 
 234. Id.  
 235. This observation is consistent with several commentators’ suggestion that Lawrence 
involved a significant amount of results-oriented reasoning across the board. See, e.g., Adam 
Lamparello, Why Justice Kennedy’s Opinion in Windsor Shortchanged Same-Sex Couples, 46 
CONN. L. REV. ONLINE 27, 34 (2013) (“Lawrence is the perfect example of using normative 
reasoning to establish legal doctrine, instead of using doctrine (and text) to establish 
constitutional norms.”). 
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The operation of this standard . . . depends substantially upon the 
level of generality at which the relevant “legal rule” is to be identified. 
For example, the right to due process of law is quite clearly 
established by the Due Process Clause, and thus there is a sense in 
which any action that violates that Clause (no matter how unclear it 
may be that the particular action is a violation) violates a clearly 
established right. Much the same could be said of any other 
constitutional or statutory violation. But if the test of “clearly 
established law” were to be applied at this level of generality, it would 
bear no relationship to the “objective legal reasonableness” that is the 
touchstone of [the test] . . . . It should not be surprising, therefore, that 
our cases establish that the right the official is alleged to have violated 
must have been “clearly established” in a more particularized, and 
hence more relevant, sense: The contours of the right must be 
sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that 
what he is doing violates that right. This is not to say that an official 
action is protected by qualified immunity unless the very action in 
question has previously been held unlawful, but it is to say that in the 
light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent.236  
Notice in particular how this passage begins with a description of 
a characterization problem and ends with a prescription for some form 
of fair notice-based reasonableness review. Legal rules, the paragraph 
suggests, should be characterized in a sufficiently particularized 
manner so as to prevent the withholding of immunity from an officer 
who acted reasonably. To know whether a rule has been characterized 
properly, one must therefore peek ahead to the subsequent steps of the 
inquiry.237 One must ask whether the rule so characterized would 
support or undermine a finding of qualified immunity, and one must 
then ask whether such a finding would cohere with the objectively 
reasonable or unreasonable nature of the officer’s behavior. If so, 
adopt the characterization; if not, adopt a different characterization 
that would produce the desired result. In other words, rather than 
assess an officer’s reasonableness by asking whether the violated rule 
was clearly established, make the violated rule as clearly established or 
 
 236. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639–40 (1987) (citation omitted) (citing Mitchell v. 
Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 535 n.12 (1985)). 
 237. This idea is reminiscent of Richard Fallon’s suggestion that courts sometimes “peek 
ahead” at the potential remedial consequences of a given substantive outcome before deciding 
whether to vindicate a legal claim on its merits. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Linkage Between 
Justiciability and Remedies–And Their Connections to Substantive Rights, 92 VA. L. REV. 633, 642 
(2006); see also Michael Coenen, Spillover Across Remedies, 98 MINN. L. REV. 1211, 1223–44 
(2014) (highlighting additional examples of the practice). 
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not clearly established as needed to ensure that reasonable conduct is 
immunized and unreasonable conduct is not. 
The above-quoted passages reflect express judicial 
acknowledgments of the connection between characterization choices 
and desired doctrinal results. But the practice might also occur 
implicitly, with courts either secretly or subconsciously turning to 
outcome-based considerations to guide their characterizations of the 
facts. Want to conclude that Congress has regulated an activity that is 
impermissibly noneconomic? Then characterize the activity in 
noneconomic terms.238 Want to conclude that a federal law preempts a 
state law? Then characterize each law’s regulatory field in broad and 
overlapping terms.239 Want to conclude that a plaintiff lacks Article III 
standing? Then characterize the plaintiff’s injury as a grievance that 
defies easy remediation.240 In short, where the facts alone lend 
themselves to myriad different characterizations, courts may simply 
(and silently) select the characterization that best justifies an outcome 
that they already want to reach. 
At first glance, all of this might look rather untoward; indeed, 
critics might be quick to dismiss the approach as implicating the ever-
dreaded specter of results-oriented judging. But while abusive or 
manipulative instances of results-based characterization choices are 
easy to imagine, other instances of the approach might turn out to be 
less problematic than first meets the eye. Much depends on what sorts 
of considerations are orienting the court toward the decisional 
outcome it wishes to reach. Suppose, for instance, that a judge surveys 
the facts of a substantive due process case and finds herself struck by 
the extent of the burdens that the claimant has endured. The judge 
might say to herself: “These facts sure look to me like the facts of a 
‘fundamental-rights’-type case,” and she might accordingly 
characterize the facts in terms of a right whose fundamentality is 
manifest. Similarly, suppose that a judge surveys the facts of a qualified 
immunity case and finds herself thinking that the defendant could not 
reasonably have known about the illegality of his actions. The judge 
might say to herself: “These facts sure look to me like the facts of a 
‘not-clearly-established-law’-type case,” and accordingly characterize 
the facts in terms of a “rule” whose “clearly established” nature could 
not be shown. In sum, where the motivating values of the 
 
 238. See, e.g., Schapiro & Buzbee, supra note 104, at 1261.  
 239. See, e.g., Preemption, supra note 158, at 1067.  
 240. See Nichol, supra note 135, at 80.  
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characterization choice bear a close resemblance to the underlying 
values of the decision rule itself, results-based characterization choices 
may represent a perfectly legitimate approach to a difficult doctrinal 
problem. 
But even where a results-based characterization choice derives 
from legitimate considerations, there exists another, more serious 
problem with the reasoning process that it reflects. The trouble is the 
now-apparent pointlessness of the characterization itself. Our 
hypothetical judge did not rely on any particular description of the 
underlying right reflected by the facts to conclude that she was dealing 
with a fundamental-rights-type case, just as she did not need any 
particular description of the underlying law to conclude that she was 
dealing with a not-clearly-established-law-type case. Rather, she 
reached those respective conclusions by engaging with the facts 
holistically and consulting her own impressions of those facts. In a very 
real sense, then, the mode of her analysis departed from the analysis 
that her decision rule described. She did not identify a right and then 
consider its fundamentality, nor did she identify a law and then 
consider its clearly established nature; rather, she saw in one fact 
pattern the trappings of a fundamental rights-type case, and she saw 
within another fact pattern the trappings of a not-clearly-established-
law-type case. What she characterized as the relevant input of the 
decision rule did not in fact operate as an input to her decisionmaking 
inquiry. Rather, the relevant input—to the extent there was one—was 
simply the entirety of the fact pattern before her. 
What all of that suggests is that a results-based approach to 
characterization choices—even though capable of offering a coherent, 
transparent, and even determinate basis for choosing among 
competing characterizations of the facts—will cast doubt on the legal 
force of the decision rules it guides. Where courts find themselves 
characterizing inputs by reference to desired doctrinal results, they 
have not so much arrived at a solution to characterization problems as 
they have revealed themselves to be evaluating something other than 
the input being characterized. In this sense, the decision rule they 
purport to apply will turn out to misdescribe the inquiry being 
conducted. 
C. Precedent-Driven Characterization 
Let us now consider a third approach to the characterization 
process, which calls for the making of characterization choices in a 
precedent-based manner. At first glance, this approach appears to have 
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much going in its favor. Courts, after all, routinely rely on precedents 
when applying law to fact, and a broad and well-established body of 
case law can help to channel seemingly unbounded legal inquiries. If 
common-law-like reasoning can discipline courts’ assessment of 
questions like “was this conduct reasonable?,” “was this punishment 
cruel and unusual?,” and “was this defendant deprived of due 
process?,” then perhaps it can discipline their characterizations of the 
facts as well. 
An example may help to illustrate the idea. Recall our earlier 
discussion of the Court’s varying characterizations of injuries in Article 
III standing cases.241 In cases such as Linda R.S. v. Richard D., Warth 
v. Seldin, and Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 
the Court defined the relevant injury as an actual failure to obtain a 
desired resource; in cases such as Regents of the University of California 
v. Bakke, the Court defined the relevant injury as a failure to compete 
for the desired resource on an equal footing with others. Suppose that 
we now confront a case in which a plaintiff claims that an allegedly 
unlawful activity has frustrated her ability to obtain a resource she 
desires. We must decide whether the plaintiff has Article III standing, 
and to do so, we must further characterize the facts in terms of an injury 
that the plaintiff has suffered. How do we decide whether to 
characterize the injury in Linda R.S.-like “actuality” terms (to wit, “the 
plaintiff’s alleged injury is the failure to obtain the resource she 
desires”) or Bakke-like “opportunity” terms (to wit, “the plaintiff’s 
alleged injury is the failure to compete for the resource on an equal 
basis”)? One seemingly straightforward approach to the problem 
would say: “Compare the facts of this case to the facts of Linda R.S., 
Warth, Simon, and Bakke; figure out which of those cases is most 
factually similar to the current case; and adopt whatever type of 
characterization the most similar case utilized.” The approach, in other 
words, seems to require no peeking ahead to the likely outcome of the 
Article III standing inquiry. Nor does it seem to suffer from any 
obvious indeterminacy problems. It simply calls upon courts to 
compare one set of facts to another and to utilize that comparison as 
the basis for the characterization choices that they make.242 
 
 241. See supra Part II.E. 
 242. One might understand in similar terms the court’s suggestion in Obergefell that the 
relevant right was a “right to marriage” rather than, say, a “right to same-sex marriage.” That 
former characterization was appropriate, the Court reasoned, because “Loving did not ask about 
a ‘right to interracial marriage’; Turner did not ask about a ‘right of inmates to marry’; and 
Zablocki did not ask about a ‘right of fathers with unpaid child support duties to marry.’” See 
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Here too, however, our prescribed approach runs into difficulties. 
The first difficulty relates back to a point we earlier considered in 
assessing the virtues of characterization-dependent decision rules as 
compared to totality-of-the-circumstances tests and other rules that 
call for a holistic assessment of all the facts.243 A potential advantage of 
the former over the latter, I earlier suggested, might relate to the 
efficiency of precedential analysis: namely, where a decision rule 
operates on characterized facts rather than the totality of a case’s facts, 
courts can draw guidance from past applications of the rule without 
having to reappraise themselves of the many different fact patterns to 
which it previously applied. When, for instance, we ask whether an 
injury is concrete enough to pass muster under Article III, the 
characterization-dependent nature of Article III standing doctrine 
allows us assess the injury’s concreteness without having to scrutinize 
every fact of relevance to every prior decision. We can simply compare 
our currently characterized injury to previously characterized injuries 
and decide whether, in light of those comparisons, the injury should 
qualify as concrete. The characterization process, in other words, 
forges a sort of informational shortcut along which we can reach 
precedentially justified conclusions in a quick and easy manner. 
That argument collapses, however, if we must consult prior 
precedents in order to render a characterization of the relevant input 
itself. If this is true, then the characterization-dependent decision rule 
turns out not to alleviate any informational burdens. To be sure, we 
need not consider the raw facts of prior cases when we compare the 
characterized fact of our case to the characterized facts of previous 
cases; but we still must consider the raw facts of those previous cases in 
order to figure out what our new, characterized input should be. If, in 
other words, we have decided that raw facts of our current standing 
controversy warrant an opportunity-based characterization of the 
inquiry because and only because those facts line up more closely to 
the raw facts of previous cases in which we adopted a similar, 
opportunity-based characterizations—then we have lost the benefit of 
the informational shortcut that our decision rule had originally seemed 
to deliver.244 True, we need not consider all the raw facts of all the 
 
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015). In other words, precisely because previous 
substantive due process cases involving marriage had characterized the relevant right as a “right 
to marriage,” that characterization remained appropriate in Obergefell as well. Yoshino, supra 
note 219, at 165–66 (considering a similar interpretation of this passage). 
 243. See supra Part III.B. 
 244. In fact, we are worse off now, because we have to consider the nine “raw” facts of cases 
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previous cases when evaluating the concreteness of the injury we 
characterized—at this stage of the inquiry, we can simply compare our 
characterized injury to previously characterized injuries that did and 
did not qualify as concrete under our prior decisions. But that is by now 
a moot point, as we already had to consult all of those prior facts back 
when we were figuring out how to characterize the injury in question. 
But even putting to one side concerns about efficiency and 
information overload, there exists yet another problem with a 
precedent-based approach to the making of characterization choices. 
We thus far have spoken as if analogical reasoning proceeds on the 
assumption that one set of facts either will be or will not be similar to 
another set of facts, full stop. But facts can be similar and dissimilar in 
different respects, and the analogical reasoning process must therefore 
depend on some additional criterion for evaluating the relevance of the 
similarities and dissimilarities that do appear.245 We should not deem 
Case A to be controlled by Case B because the respective plaintiffs 
have the same first name; but we might have reason to deem Case A to 
be controlled by Case B because the respective plaintiffs each acted 
recklessly. Some factual connections matter more than others, and a 
central challenge of precedential analysis is that of explaining why the 
relevant connections matter and why the irrelevant connections do not. 
What that in turn means is that precedent-driven characterization 
choices must ultimately appeal to some set of values that lie outside the 
factual similarities and dissimilarities that they invoke. And if that is 
so, then it becomes unclear whether a nominally operative decision 
rule is in fact performing any analytical work above and beyond what 
the value-driven precedential choices already reflect. This is not, to be 
clear, a knock on precedential reasoning itself; there are benefits to 
drawing connections across cases, even if doing so presents some tough 
analytical choices.246 Rather, my point is simply to question the need 
for a decision rule whose input will be determined according to 
precedent-based reasoning. One cannot ask whether Case A is 
 
A, B, and C in addition to the three characterized facts that we constructed. 
 245. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 576–77 (1987) (“Reasoning 
from precedent, whether looking back to the past or ahead to the future, presupposes an ability 
to identify the relevant precedent.”); Cass R. Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. 
REV. 741, 745 (1993) (“The major challenge facing analogical reasoners is to decide when 
differences are relevant.”). 
 246. See, e.g., Randy J. Kozel, Stare Decisis in the Second-Best World, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 1139, 
1159 (2015) (“Second-best stare decisis reflects the Court’s descriptions of the virtues of 
continuity–and the costs of vacillation–by recognizing a presumption of fidelity to precedent and 
by separating the treatment of precedent disagreements over interpretive philosophy.”). 
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relevantly similar to Case B without also asking whether the rationale 
for Case A’s result supports a similar result in Case B as well. But once 
that latter question has been asked and answered, the legal relevance 
of the decision rule has diminished if not vanished. Having determined 
that two cases are sufficiently similar to warrant similar 
characterizations of a given doctrinal input, one has necessarily 
determined that the two cases are sufficiently similar to warrant a 
similar doctrinal result. And if that is clear, the question once again 
emerges: why not cut out the seemingly unnecessary intermediate step 
of requiring any sort of characterization in the first place? 
Put another way, once we acknowledge that a precedent-driven 
characterization choice must incorporate the past dispositions of cases 
as the relevant analogical lodestar, our purportedly precedent-based 
approach to the characterization process may turn out to be nothing 
more than a results-based approach in precedential disguise. Looking 
to past decisions for guidance regarding the characterization of 
constitutional inputs may be no different from looking to past decisions 
for guidance regarding the proper application of the rule to which it 
attaches. And if that is true, then it is the desired result, rather than a 
previous characterization from the previous case, that is moving the 
characterization choice forward. If the similarities between two Article 
III standing cases are sufficiently material to warrant similar 
characterizations of each case’s relevant injury, they will also be 
sufficiently material to warrant the conclusion that each case presents 
an injury-in-fact situation. If the similarities between two Commerce 
Clause cases are sufficiently material to warrant similar 
characterizations of each case’s relevant activity, they will also be 
sufficiently material to warrant the conclusion that each case presents 
a noneconomic-activity situation. Our precedent-driven 
characterization choices thus end up reproducing the problems 
presented by their results-based counterparts—if our characterizations 
of the facts are operating as nothing more than post hoc justifications 
for results we have independently derived, then the characterization-
dependent decision rule serves no meaningful doctrinal purpose. 
There remains, of course, the possibility of developing some other 
results-neutral basis for distinguishing relevant from irrelevant factual 
connections across cases. If such a basis could be developed, then a 
precedent-based approach to the characterization process would steer 
clear of the problems we associated with its results-oriented 
counterpart. But while I cannot disprove the existence of any such a 
method, I am skeptical that it will ever be found. I am skeptical, in 
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other words, that we can devise a way to make meaningful factual 
comparisons across cases without in some way thinking about what the 
underlying holding of our current case should be. And thus, once again, 
a precedent-driven approach to characterization problems is likely to 
buy us coherence and determinacy, but only at the expense of 
rendering our decisions nonresponsive to the decision rules that 
purport to guide them. 
*** 
We have thus failed to identify an approach to characterization 
choices that affords consistent and concrete guidance without 
rendering obsolete the decision rules to which they attach.247 That does 
 
 247. But perhaps we have been too pessimistic. Even if we fail to develop a fully satisfactory 
set of instructions for rendering characterization choices—instructions that usefully channel and 
constrain characterization choices without replicating the evaluative choices they are meant to 
precede—we might nonetheless develop some satisfactory shortcuts that simplify the approach. 
Two possibilities come to mind. 
 First, courts could rely on common sense. On this view, one need simply consult one’s 
initial psychological intuitions regarding the best way to characterize a given constitutional input. 
I do not need some abstract theory or scholarly exegesis to explain why I am currently typing this 
footnote on a “computer” as opposed to a “metal box,” “calculating machine,” “machine,” 
“Apple,” or “keyboard connected to microchips connected to a screen.” All of those descriptions 
are technically accurate, but “computer” just seems like the right one to use in this context, even 
if I cannot explain precisely why that is so. And perhaps a similar point holds for the 
characterization choices that judges must make. It does not take extensive legal analysis, some 
might argue, to see why the Gun Free School Zones Act regulates the activity of “gun possession 
in a school zone” as opposed to the activity of “gun-based school endangerment” or something 
more abstract. The former just seems obviously correct, one might argue, and the latter just seems 
ridiculous. Judges have to make characterization choices all of the time, and perhaps it is simply 
enough to say that they should continue to do so by reference to whatever hunches and intuitions 
have guided them in the past. 
But even if we concede that there exist commonsensical solutions to some characterization 
choices, it is unlikely that our intuitions will always identify an obvious path forward—especially 
with respect to the sorts of “hard,” unresolved questions that we have grappled with in this 
Article. In addition, it may sometimes be difficult to disaggregate our intuitions about how a case 
should be decided from our intuitions about what the appropriate characterization of an input 
should be. If so, then the “commonsensical” approach collapses into the results-based approach 
we have already considered and critiqued. See supra Part IV.B. And finally, though commonsense 
intuitions represent a perfectly appropriate basis for characterizing the things around us in daily 
life, it is unclear whether such a “just take my word for it” approach reflects an appropriate basis 
for the making of legal choices—choices that should be justified rather than simply proclaimed. 
See, e.g., Todd E. Pettys, Judicial Discretion in Constitutional Cases, 26 J.L. & POL. 123, 169–70 
(2011) (noting that “judges are expected to explain the reasons for the interpretive choices they 
make”). 
 A second potential strategy might attempt to farm out characterization choices to the 
parties litigating a case, with judges choosing an authoritative input characterization from a pool 
of potential characterizations that the litigants propose. If the parties agree to a single 
characterization choice, the choice gets made for the court and no further effort is required. 
Otherwise, the parties will have at least narrowed the choice down to a handful of candidates out 
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not mean that no such approach exists; perhaps, for instance, generality 
levels can be measured and identified with greater objectivity than I 
have suggested, perhaps courts could employ some optimal hybrid 
approach that combines generality-based, results-based, and 
precedent-based reasoning, or perhaps they could turn to some other 
set of guiding criterion that I have neglected altogether. But to the 
extent courts have at their disposal a set of fail-safe, foolproof, and 
doctrine-preserving approaches to characterizing constitutional inputs, 
I have not managed to put my finger on any such approaches here. 
V.  CHARACTERIZING CONSTITUTIONAL OUTPUTS? 
Let us assume, then, that the only reliable means of rendering 
characterization choices is to identify desired outcomes and to choose 
a characterized input that conduces to that outcome. If true, that 
conclusion should cast doubt on the utility of prescribing 
characterization-dependent decision rules; it should suggest in 
particular that such decision rules will fail to guide judicial 
decisionmaking any more effectively than various characterization-
 
of a multitude of possibilities, and the adversarial nature of the judicial process will help to ensure 
that each respective candidate reflects a plausible, if somewhat tilted, solution. In effect, courts 
would enlist the machinery of the adversarial system in an effort to simplify the decision before 
them—in much the same way that they sometimes solicit parties’ assistance in preparing jury 
instructions, see FED. R. CIV. P. 51(a), flagging trial court errors, see FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b) 
(restricting appellate review of errors not identified at trial), identifying grounds for appeal, see, 
e.g., Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 243 (2008) (noting that “we rely on the parties to 
frame the issues for decision”), and so forth, see Amanda Frost, The Limits of Advocacy, 59 DUKE 
L.J. 447, 455–70 (2009) (identifying several examples of (and exceptions to) the “party 
presentation norm”).  
 The party-driven approach strikes me as promising—and certainly worthy of much more 
exploration than I have been able to offer here. But two points, I think, must be kept in mind. 
First, even if party-driven choices manage to narrow the range of candidate inputs for a court to 
choose from, there still exists the critical question of how to select a winner from the candidates. 
And since the parties will likely propose candidate inputs that conduce to their respective 
positions in a case, that selection choice will remain just as consequential as a choice that was 
made without the parties’ initial assistance. Second, party-driven characterization is susceptible 
to the criticism that it delegates a core component of judicial power away from the courts. 
Compare, e.g., Frost, supra, at 483 (noting that “[j]udicial independence, and the respect for 
judicial decisionmaking that accompanies it, would be compromised if courts were required to 
rule on the law as it is presented to them, rather than as they believe it to be”), with Gary Lawson, 
Stipulating the Law, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1191, 1196 (2011) (observing that “standard American 
practice does not generally allow parties to stipulate to legal conclusions,” while contending “that 
it should”). Thus, even if it represents a promising means of simplifying characterization 
problems, the party-driven approach might amount to a constitutionally problematic abdication 
of the courts’ authority to “say what the law is.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 
(1803).  
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resistant alternatives that might instead be used. That conclusion, in 
turn, should prompt us to reconsider the question whether 
characterization-dependent decision rules ought ever to factor into the 
doctrine at all. If characterization choices simply function as a stand-in 
for holistic, all-things-considered assessments of facts and prior 
precedents, why not simply instruct courts to perform those 
assessments directly and on their own terms? 
The remaining question thus becomes whether characterization-
dependent decision rules—rules, for instance, that turn on the 
fundamentality of an asserted right, the clearly established nature of a 
violated law, the economic nature of a regulated activity, and so forth—
could furnish any doctrinal value apart from that of constraining 
judicial outcomes. If, in other words, characterization-dependent 
decision rules offer nothing in the way of increased predictability and 
control when it comes to reaching judicial results, should they simply 
be jettisoned altogether or might we still have good reason to keep 
them around? 
While an in-depth analysis of this question lies beyond the scope 
of the Article, I want to sketch out one potential response that a 
proponent of characterization might give. Conceding that 
characterization-dependent decision rules do not help to determine 
constitutional results, the response would maintain that such rules 
remain a useful means of communicating the results once reached. In 
a nutshell, the claim is this: characterization-dependent decision rules 
are best understood as output- rather than input-focused. Their 
primary virtue lies not in dictating or determining judicial outcomes, 
but rather in situating those outcomes within a single, continuous, and 
easy-to-digest narrative about the development of the law through 
time. Characterizations of the facts might in this sense operate not so 
much as a necessary first step to the process of determining a case’s 
result, but rather as a useful sort of justificatory glue that helps to 
connect up that result with the results of past cases. If constitutional 
adjudication turns out to resemble the task of writing a chain novel,248 
characterization-dependent rules might provide the vocabulary 
necessary to help that novel read smoothly. 
Specifically, the argument would begin by inviting us to reconsider 
the models of constitutional adjudication that we developed in Part I, 
 
 248. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 229–38 (1986); see also Tribe & Dorf, supra 
note 6, at 1072–77 (discussing Dworkin’s analogy that using precedent is like “the composition of 
a chain novel”). 
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proposing instead a model that looks like this: 
Figure 3: Alternative Model of Constitutional Adjudication 
 
Like our previous models, this model highlights law identification 
and fact identification as the initial steps of the decisionmaking process. 
But at this point the models would diverge. Whereas the previous 
models saw the law identification process as yielding a decision rule 
that courts would then apply to a characterized fact, this model depicts 
the identified law as some body of sources with relevance to the legal 
question before the court—sources a court would then consider in 
conjunction with the entirety of a case’s facts before exercising a 
judgment from which the actual judicial outcome derives. The case’s 
outcome, in other words, no longer depends on a characterization of 
the facts and an application of a decision rule to the characterized fact; 
rather, its outcome depends on an unfettered (and largely 
indescribable) exercise of human judgment—a judgment that attempts 
to account for and respond to all the factual and legal data that the fact- 
and law-identification processes have respectively produced. 
But identifying the appropriate outcome does not end the judge’s 
work; there remains the task of translating judgment into 
justification—the task of communicating to the public the reasons why 
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the outcome is the appropriate one to reach. It is only here that the 
characterization process enters the picture. Specifically, the judge 
proceeds to recast (a) the large and complex body of legal precedents 
that she worked with in terms of a single legal decision rule that all of 
those precedents can be read to support; and (b) the large and complex 
body of factual information that she worked with in terms of the single 
characterized input to which that decision rule applies. From here, one 
final step remains: that of explaining why the characterized fact does 
or does not satisfy the evaluative criteria of the decision rule itself. 
With that model in place, we can now return to the question with 
which this Part began: Why bother with the characterization process at 
all? The best answer to this question, I think, would have to appeal to 
the value of showcasing apparent continuity across cases. By explaining 
its judgments in terms of decision rules and characterizations of the 
facts, courts can employ a vocabulary of justification that facilitates 
easy comparisons to and from other constituent components of the 
case law. This language allows them to direct attention away from 
surface-level dissimilarities by noting higher-level similarities across 
the relevant interests, rights, activities, fields, or purposes manifested 
by these fact patterns. It allows them to seize on other, perhaps subtler 
similarities by characterizing the facts in terms that bring those 
similarities to the forefront. It perhaps even allows them to foreshadow 
and encourage future doctrinal developments by highlighting within a 
present-day fact pattern a new type of characterized fact with emerging 
legal significance. In short, to the extent that judges wish to articulate 
a smooth and linear narrative about the development of the law over 
time, the characterization process may turn out to useful to that goal. 
To be sure, judges might still be able to highlight doctrinal 
connectivity without resorting to characterization-heavy justifications 
of the legal and factual sources before them. It may be possible, for 
instance, to draw out clear and simple connections across substantive 
due process cases without ever speaking of a single unifying right that 
those cases involved, just as it may be possible to draw out clear and 
simple connections across Article III standing cases without ever 
speaking of a single unifying injury that all those cases share. But this 
is where the open-ended nature of the characterization process might 
turn out to be a feature rather than a bug. Characterized inputs, unlike 
raw facts, can be tweaked and tailored to line up with the previous 
characterized facts that they “need” to line up with. For example, if two 
cases look different in one respect, that difference can be downplayed 
via the use of strategic characterizations that make the two cases look 
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more alike. Similarly, if two cases look similar in another respect, that 
similarity can be downplayed via the use of characterizations that bring 
a less immediately apparent distinction to the fore. All of this might 
well be achievable in a world that abjures abstract-input decision rules 
and the characterization choices that they require. Nevertheless, 
characterization-dependent decision rules might still carry the virtue of 
making the outcome somewhat easier for courts to achieve. 
What the characterization process thus accomplishes is the 
perhaps-valuable task of drawing out thematic connections across 
cases and showcasing continuity where chaos and randomness would 
otherwise reign. Even where prior decisions fail to dictate future 
outcomes, courts might still have reason to cast those outcomes in 
terms that resonate and accord with the prior decisions ex post. The 
effect may be largely artificial—akin to that of tracing out a 
constellation amongst a cluster of unrelated stars—but perhaps the 
appearance of order and continuity across cases remains worth 
achieving for its own sake.249 I’m not sure. On the one hand, it looks 
like deception; but on the other hand, it may simply describe what 
precedent-based decisionmaking has always set out to do. 
CONCLUSION 
Input-characterization problems might best be seen as a 
byproduct of the Court’s efforts to generate outcomes that are 
consistent in relation to prior decisions and correct in relation to case-
specific facts. Characterization-dependent decision rules resemble 
their targeted-input counterparts in that they prescribe structured 
assessments of specified inputs rather than freewheeling assessments 
of everything. But they also resemble their holistic-input counterparts 
in that the inputs themselves are capacious enough to accommodate 
some level of tailoring to the individual demands of each case. These 
decision rules, in short, thus attempt to have their cake and eat it too—
imposing a coherence-promoting structure on the decisionmaking 
inquiry while leaving enough play in the joints to avoid anomalous-
 
 249. In a recent article, Professor Adam Samaha has drawn attention to a variety of ways in 
which appearance-based concerns might justify government action, regardless of underlying 
realities. A good example involves campaign finance regulation, which, according to the Court 
itself, might validly serve a governmental interest in reducing the public appearance of corruption, 
even where actual corruption is unlikely to occur. See Adam M. Samaha, Regulation for the Sake 
of Appearance, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1563, 1599–1620 (2012). Whether a similar sort of appearance-
based justification might succeed at vindicating the Court’s own utilization of characterization-
dependent decision rules is a question that ultimately lies beyond the scope of this article. 
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seeming judicial results. 
What this Article has suggested, however, is that the coherence-
promoting benefits of characterization-dependent decision rules may 
turn out to be more illusory than real. As long as we lack a predictable 
and results-neutral approach to the making of characterization choices, 
the tests that they affect may turn out to be no less all-encompassing 
and unconstrained than their holistic-input counterparts. In other 
words, characterization-dependent decision rules might seem to 
prescribe approaches to decisionmaking that usefully channel judicial 
discretion but in reality will involve the same sort of all-things-
considered decisionmaking that they purport to disallow. 
It remains to be asked whether the appearance of doctrinal 
coherence might ever be worth pursuing in its own right. Even where 
the doctrine fails to predict, constrain, or control judicial outcomes in 
a meaningful way, perhaps courts might still have reason to “talk 
about” that doctrine in a manner that highlights themes of continuity 
and consistency over time. This is an issue I have not here resolved, but 
I hope at least to have highlighted its stakes. If we value apparent 
coherence, then characterization-dependent decision rules might carry 
the useful purpose of making constitutional law seem to be more 
orderly than it actually is. If not, then it becomes more difficult to 
justify their continued presence within the law. 
